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Public Administration Review

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IN THIS NUMBER

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Lyman S. Moore as City Manager of Portland, Maine

By HELEN C. FROST

*Member of the City Council
Portland, Maine*

IN THE early spring of 1946, the City Council of Portland, Maine, began thinking seriously about the successor to its long-time City Manager, James E. Barlow, who was retiring in October. The task was more difficult than might ordinarily be supposed because at the midwinter election the Council had been enlarged from five to nine members, and on the Council were six members who had never had any experience in municipal government under the manager form. Since the retiring Manager had held the position for seventeen years, no very recent canvass had been made of the personal and professional qualities needed to be a successful Manager in Portland.

The Job Finds the Man

WITH the dual purpose, then, of acquainting themselves with what the job required in the man and of evaluating what Portland had to offer under its charter in management opportunity, the Council prepared a profile of the person it hoped to secure as its new City Manager. Mr. Moore is known to have said that it was because Portland knew what it wanted that he was interested in the position. At a very early point in its deliberations the committee of selection had in its hands a most interesting letter from him, and from that moment Portland experienced one of its richest and most rewarding chapters.

From the correspondence files of the committee we find ample evidence that Lyman Moore's desire to return to the field of city management was because "it is in local government that the democratic process has its roots." He believed that "as much as possible of the government job should be done in and by the

local community itself, because popular control can be most effective and the program can be effectively adapted to the needs of the community." His statement of his qualifications, beyond the obviously excellent professional background he presented, held the following paragraph:

The only additional qualifications to be stated in this letter are a deep concern with making democracy work, faith in the council-manager plan as an effective democratic tool, a belief that the Council plays the principal role in establishing a municipal program responsive to the needs and aspirations of the community, and a conviction that the manager must constantly weigh his policy recommendations against the wishes and requirements of the community.

So spoke the man from the National Housing Agency in Washington, D. C., generating in this New England community a confidence which was later proved to be so well justified.

From the stimulating interviews held in Montreal at the convention of the International City Managers' Association and during a visit he made to Portland there are these recollections: the discerning questions he asked, the breadth of his interests in the municipal program, the wealth of his information on many subjects. These interviews led the selection committee to believe that Portland would be invigorated and revitalized through his leadership. For example, on the steps of City Hall, on the occasion of his first visit, he said: "The building called City Hall is not as important as the people in it. It's the people in City Hall that make a good administration." Then, after a pause, "What is the average age of your department heads?" It was a good

question—and as time went on, with a minimum of disruption he prepared for the inevitable retirement of many of the city's faithful older employees.

Lyman Moore Comes to Portland

FROM the intricacies of the Washington scene to the informality and simplicity of a small New England city, there was a change of pressure but not of pace—for Lyman Moore was determined to learn all that he could of the people of Portland and of the town he was to manage. He was anxious to move in all circles, and he joined no service clubs or other organizations in order to be free of commitments and available to all. It is a matter of record that in his first year in Portland he attended 72 gatherings as principal speaker. These groups varied greatly in interest and size, from 20 or 25 at a Townsend Club supper, a Junior League provisional study group, and a meeting to award Eagle Scout badges, to a 300-member gathering of service clubs, to a group of 1,200 Community Chest workers.

Mr. Moore was a skillful, gracious speaker. He knew how to phrase his message in language that fitted the particular audience. The file of his speeches reveals his singular ability in achieving a meeting of minds with the people to whom he spoke. It also reveals his philosophy of managership and his desire to identify himself with the Portland community for the long pull. I remember especially the Community Chest dinner where he wove a wonderful message in beautiful, simple language around the classical history of the independent towns of ancient Europe to an audience that was a cross section of the city of Portland.

Mr. Moore was as anxious to know the physical characteristics and the geography of the city as he was to know its people. During his first months in Portland he drove about the city endlessly at the week ends with his family, noting everything and filing away questions to put to department heads later about things he did not understand or fully approve.

Mr. Moore's extraordinary efforts in his first year in Portland bore fruit throughout his managership. In that year he became acquainted with most of the people with whom he had to deal and gained background knowl-

edge that helped greatly in solving the problems of the city.

The Pattern of His Managership

MR. MOORE brought with him to Portland well formulated ideas of the proper relationships between the City Manager and the Council. He believed that an important function of the Manager was to provide the Council with information on which to base its decisions, and he made every effort to glean the best possible information and background materials on any given problem that confronted the city. With such information at hand, the Councilors would be able to make the best decision or to choose the best solution or to understand and accept the Manager's recommendation. For this service to the Council he was rarely gifted. His intellect was profound. It had an imaginative and creative quality, yet it was logical and discriminating to give it balance. He had an extraordinary capacity for reading, assimilating what he read, selecting and analyzing what was useful, and rephrasing and outlining it for the use of the Council.

On occasion, when the Council had before it an unusually complex problem, Mr. Moore would offer not one but several choices of solution or procedure. If there were ethical or political principles involved, he was resourceful, not in compromise but in flexibility. Examples were his recommendation for assessment procedures to assure equity in taxes between classifications and his proposals to assist industry to buy city lands at public bid. When his first recommendations seemed unsatisfactory to the Council, he approached these problems anew and brought in solutions that the Council could accept and the Manager could administer. The best example of this flexibility was the outcome of the public housing debate which resulted in the rejection of public housing and the acceptance of a slum clearance and redevelopment program.

One technique for keeping the Council, and through the Council the public, informed was a Council letter which gave background for the matters to be discussed at the next meeting. There were also invaluable written reports made at the request of the Council. There was, however, a minimum of paper work, and

memorandums were prepared only when the problem justified the time and effort. The Manager was very close to the members of the Council. He worked informally with small interim committees of the Council and discussed long-range planning and financial policies with Council members frequently and with great thoroughness, thus laying the foundation for recommendations and decisions to be made at the proper time.

Perhaps the most rewarding phase of Mr. Moore's administration was the adoption of a sound financial program for the city. This program was developed as a result of the Manager's ability to act as interpreter and adviser to the Council on the advantages of judicious long-range planning.

When Mr. Moore's first budget was in process of development, the Council was alerted that much more than the necessary funds for the operating budget was under discussion. Far-reaching proposals were discussed at every meeting of the finance committee of the Council and within a few months the Manager's plan began to take shape. As finally formulated it contained two major departures from previous policy. First, the operating budget provided approximately \$300,000 for capital improvements that cost \$50,000 or less to be paid for out of current revenues. In some years even larger projects could be absorbed. Second, the operating budget also included a four-year plan for the maintenance and improvement of city streets. These two departures from previous policy resulted in saving the borrowing capacity of the city for more extensive capital projects, such as schools, sewers, and major street construction.

Since the inclusion of these programs in the operating budget resulted in higher total expenditures, it was necessary to change the assessment program to provide the funds. A step in this direction was the strengthening of the Department of Assessments through additional staff and the installation of modern business machines. Even more effective, however, was a slow and careful study of inequities and oversights, in many instances among individual tax assessments but largely in over-all classifications. Thus, assessments were augmented slowly in various categories. In this process it became evident to the Manager and the Council that sufficient inequities existed to justify

a major study and on the recommendation of the Manager a citizens tax committee was appointed. After several months study this committee presented a report which made several major recommendations, the most important of which was that there be a revaluation of real and personal property in the city.

In Maine there is no statutory requirement for a periodic revaluation. Portland had not had one since 1926. Mr. Moore recognized and advised the Council of all the hazards involved, of the unsettling and controversial situations that might well arise, but he also provided the leadership to carry the city through the difficulties of this major operation. At each step in the program, from contracting with the firm to undertake the revaluation to conducting the citizens hearings at its conclusion, Mr. Moore exhibited in high degree his qualities of fairness and adherence to the principles of equity. After the revaluation program was completed, the administration held the confidence and approval of the citizens. From the time Mr. Moore took office until his death the assessed valuation of the city was increased by \$23,000,000, or 33 per cent.

Related to, indeed founded upon, this financial program is the capital improvement budget. The Planning Board, created in 1942, had operated with a consultant and a staff engineer until 1946. Mr. Moore recommended that the Council provide the Planning Board with a full-time director of planning. The Council adopted this recommendation and as a result each year the Planning Board presents the Council with a capital program. Priorities are established for the various projects, and cost estimates are included. It is from this list that the Council selects the improvements to cost approximately \$300,000 that are included in each year's operating budget. Capital improvements for which borrowing is necessary are provided for by funding at the rate of \$1,000,000 every three years. This sum is offset by the program of debt retirement provided in a corollary policy. The entire financial program is designed to keep the city in a stable debt position and to leave a reasonable margin of borrowing capacity for emergencies. In the period since the adoption of the program Moody's financial rating of the city has become Triple A.

The financial policies of Mr. Moore's ad-

ministration provided the backbone and helped insure the success of the balance of his program. He always related the needs of the city to its economic ability to pay. He tailored his recommendations to provide a level of maintenance and new construction which would both renew and improve the city.

As the financial policies of the administration brought about a progressive capital improvement program, so did the Manager's recommendations relating to personnel underlie the modern program of personnel administration put into effect in City Hall. One of Mr. Moore's first recommendations to the Council was that Portland undertake a wage and salary survey. The Council authorized the survey and adopted its recommendations, with a resultant stabilizing effect on the employees. The foundation for the success of the plan lies in the job description and rating of positions. When a job has been classified, the key to the city's policy is to relate it to comparable jobs in the community. Thus, City Hall is never ahead of the community salary pattern, nor will it penalize city employees by lagging behind. Further, the plan provides for cost-of-living adjustments related to the cost-of-living reports of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Another forward step was the establishment of a Personnel Department with modern techniques and practices in offering competitive examinations, aptitude tests, on-the-job training, and opportunities for suggestions and grievances. Mr. Moore also desired to provide employees with a set of rules covering working conditions and management-employee relations and work was going forward on this project at the time of his death. Recently a set of rules was adopted that is based largely on the proposals and recommendations he left with the department.

Mr. Moore's philosophy of personnel administration achieved a happy medium between formalized policies and procedures and the use of the administrator's own gifts. Enough formalization was needed so that employees knew reasonably well where they stood, but rules and regulations were only means to an end, not an end in themselves. They should never be permitted to mushroom to the point where they got in the way of individual initiative and effective administration.

Mr. Moore brought an atmosphere to his

dealings with employees and staff that was a result of his keen interest in people as individuals. In any discussion he exhibited an attitude of respect for the point of view of the employees. He was not suspicious of their motives. He was anxious that they be given every opportunity for personal success and recognition of their abilities. He was a fair and just man. He did not expect perfection in others, but he respected a good job and was quick to recognize and give credit when he saw one. At the same time he was slow to criticize unless the facts were clear and well documented. In his words, "I'll never pass judgment on another by hearsay." His integrity in his dealings with his immediate staff and with all city employees was reflected in the level of their behavior, which was above what is ordinarily expected.

It is difficult to record in brief space the impact of Mr. Moore's administrative ability. Every municipal department showed marked improvement in efficiency, public relations, and use of staff. For example, the Building Inspection Department, a great source of irritation to the public because of delays, particularly in the busy building season, was given more staff. Meetings were held with contractors and architects to get at the sources of delay and to gain their cooperation in offering more complete plans in making application for permits. An assistant corporation counsel was made available to the department to interpret the requirements of the ordinances and to assist with preparation of the appeals procedures.

The Purchasing Department was strengthened, largely by a strict implementation of the policy of open bidding for all city business. The field was opened to all bidders without prejudice; in the case of Portland's largest single contract, the low bidder was from Massachusetts. Adherence to the policy of open bidding in this instance caused considerable controversy, but as a result of maintaining the city's position even under heavy pressure, there has been a continuing interest and good faith in submitting bids.

The story is repeated with variations in department after department. The program of the Public Works Department was surveyed to determine if it was making the best use of men and machinery and if its methods of ac-

counting and reporting were best suited to its needs. Most of the resulting recommendations for improvement have been adopted. The procedures and personnel requirements of the Department of Health and Welfare were studied and recommendations to bring basic procedures into line with modern conceptions of social work were formally approved by the Council and placed in operation. As a part of the Health and Welfare Department, the city operates a general hospital with surgical facilities, some beds for chronically ill aged patients, and quarters to provide temporary shelter for the mentally deranged. The American College of Surgeons was called in to make recommendations for improvement that would lead to the recognition of the hospital by that body. These recommendations have been largely adopted. The equipment, facilities, and operations of the Fire Department were improved so that the city of Portland received a Class A rating from the National Board of Fire Underwriters.

Some city managers never go outside the city in recruiting key personnel; others go outside in filling most or all of the important city posts. Under Lyman Moore, Portland achieved a happy balance between these two policies. It was a part of his philosophy that effectiveness in city management depends upon the development of a good team. He realized that it is not possible to get the perfect individual for every job, that it is necessary to achieve a balance in the abilities of the department heads and the city manager, and that sometimes the city manager will need to make seemingly illogical assignments in order to use the abilities of his department heads to best advantage and to secure the teamwork that is essential to good city management.

Public Relations

LYMAN MOORE had a firm faith in the values of the democratic process and chose to work in local government because it touches the lives of citizens importantly and directly. In Portland he was largely responsible for the town meeting program which brought the citizens of Portland into close relationship with their city government. He believed that it was important for city officials to learn directly the needs and desires of citizens and for citizens to understand the bases of official actions and decisions.

He therefore devised a plan of taking City Hall to the people in their own neighborhoods. Each year a town meeting was held in each of the four sections of the city. These meetings were carefully planned and all department heads worked cooperatively to bring to each neighborhood the answers to the questions of its citizens. The citizens were encouraged to express their ideas on the best answers to difficult problems. At these town meetings, Mr. Moore was a good listener. He considered all ideas, needs, and suggestions carefully and quite often incorporated them into recommendations for direct action. This method of reaching out by government to citizens received national attention; the State Department issued a foreign language release on the Portland town meetings as an exhibit of the democratic process.

Mr. Moore occasionally recommended the use of citizens' committees as a means of acquainting citizens with a given problem and of securing their help and advice in solving it. For example, a committee of citizens with personal knowledge of the problems involved in snow removal was appointed to help solve these problems. Their report was on Mr. Moore's desk when he died and much of it has since been put to use with good results. There has also been a study group for traffic flow, a housing committee, and a school plant and salary committee. All these groups have worked for the period necessary to accomplish their purpose and have disbanded. The advantages of this citizen participation in a direct way in the city's progress cannot be overestimated.

Citizens' committees have in several instances resulted in cooperative self-policing and the avoidance of restrictive ordinances. For example, the smoke abatement committee undertakes on a voluntary basis to keep the business and industrial community interested in smoke abatement. Fuel savings have been demonstrated, and as a result ordinances and official policing have not been required.

City Hall and the Manager's office were wide open to the press. Mr. Moore established the fairest kind of working arrangements for day-to-day press coverage. He also shared his long-range views with the press for general use in interpreting the municipal program. The press was cooperative in return and the public en-

joyed the results of this sensible, open-door, open-minded relationship.

Outside City Hall, Mr. Moore gave unstintingly of himself as Manager. He was most successful in cooperative planning in conjunction with the Chamber of Commerce. To this end, a series of discussion meetings was held with the Board of Directors of the Chamber and the Council. These meetings were not regularly scheduled but were called from time to time when a sufficient number of complex and interesting problems or projects were being studied or undertaken. In this way, the administration and the business community worked together toward a real program of industrial growth through proper zoning, selling appropriate city-owned property, and getting needed financial support. As a result of close cooperation between the Chamber, the Port Authority, and the city, the city contributed the major share of the cost of a port director who has been successful in bringing new shipping to the harbor.

At the state level, the Manager was consulted by the Governor concerning tax legislation and welfare matters. However, Mr. Moore approached the legislative program of the state largely through the Maine Municipal Association and the Managers' Association of Maine. He attended many legislative hearings, but he felt that the role of the Manager was as an adviser to the Council on specific bills for Portland. He did, however, through the programs of the two associations, have a marked effect on administrative practices in Maine. He was also effective in dealing with all state and county commissions where the interest of the city was involved.

He encouraged the practice of internships for students from the University of Maine in the city departments and he lectured there and at the Harvard School of Public Administration. In a lecture at the Harvard Conference on Careers, March 23, 1950, he told his audience that they could expect to get genuine personal satisfaction from working for government, and that that satisfaction would correlate inversely with their distance from the end product. He also told them they would find more chance to be creative in local government than in any business or profession, other than the physical sciences, because of the challenging diversity and complexity of the problems of local gov-

ernment. But, he warned, "in local government in addition to education you will need a thick skin, a sense of humor, a capacity for hard work, a catholic interest in people and problems, and a sincere desire to serve your neighbors well."

In Conclusion

THERE is a wealth of material available as evidence of Lyman Moore's administrative capacity and philosophy. His entire record in Portland bears the stamp of the craftsman. He gave his work the personal touch that only one who fashions with great insight and devotion to his work can give.

Because of his national reputation, he was known to a great many of those who will read this article. Perhaps it is fitting to recall to you once more the qualities of his warm heart that resulted in the extraordinary affection that so many held for this man. For it was the generosity of his spirit that gave his life its zest and flavor. It cannot be said too often that he loved people. He did not think of them as masses of people, but as individuals, and he carried this sympathetic understanding of the individual into all his dealings, personal and public.

Perhaps this understanding and sympathy can be illustrated by his attitude in sports, for Lyman Moore loved games of contest and competition. As a spectator he loved a close match. He often said in the bleachers, "I hope they tie it up in the ninth." Why? Because he wanted the losing team to have a chance to win. Again, he would be following the play, not of the star of the game, but of the little fellow backing up the play. As a player of games, he was a quick and skillful opponent, a gay and happy winner, a gracious and generous loser.

In situations that called for his more serious consideration, I should like to recall to you these characteristics of the man we have lost: his quick understanding, his willingness to help, his devotion to his family, his loyalty to his fellow worker, his acceptance of service to the nation and to the outside world—all so generously given, so fully accepted by us.

This man, endowed as he was with tremendous physical drive and blessed with a dynamic personality to fit the breadth of his vision, will leave a lasting mark on Portland and on city management as a profession.

Lyman S. Moore's Contribution To Housing and Atomic Energy

By R. O. NIEHOFF

*Chief, Training and Educational Relations
Branch, Tennessee Valley Authority*

Housing

LYMAN MOORE was Assistant Administrator for Administration of the National Housing Agency from 1942 to 1946. This position covered the complete range of administrative functions in the Office of the Administrator which supervised three major constituent agencies: the Federal Housing Administration, the Federal Public Housing Authority, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Administration. He performed these duties first under John B. Blandford, Jr., and later under Wilson W. Wyatt.

The problems of administering the housing program of the federal government during these years were nothing short of staggering. During the first three years the essential job was to weld into a functioning whole the sixteen agencies, or parts or functions of agencies, which found themselves assembled together as the result of an Executive order issued early in 1942. Housing was essential to the war effort and there was no room for the peacetime bickering-as-usual attitudes and practices which had become characteristic of the depression-born housing agencies in their relationships to one another. All talents and resources were needed—directed to the single end of getting enough housing produced to meet the needs of war workers who were building the fabulous numbers of planes and the count-

less tanks, guns, ships, and other war material. The war was hardly over when the government undertook the almost equally colossal task of catching up with the backlog of normal housing construction which had been deferred during the war and of providing housing for the returning veterans. The urgent needs of the veterans were given special emphasis under the Veterans Emergency Housing Program. The administrative problems throughout the war and postwar periods were made more complicated by the ever-present, but reasonably well submerged, complex of fears and hopes of key personnel regarding the nature of the permanent housing agency which would be created after the war. Loyalty to the war effort required a moratorium on conflict among the housing agencies in order to get the war job done, but bureaucratic eyes were cocked to the future to avoid permanent compromises with policies and practices which could easily be embarrassing when the war emergency was over.

Into this kind of emotionally charged administrative environment Lyman Moore—then only 32 years of age—took up the task of principal aid to the Administrator for special attention to management of the agency. The task required the highest degree of administrative sophistication. Major determinations had to be made "on the double." Speed was essential. Vast amounts of energy and managerial imagination had to be generated and expended on a sustained basis. Poise had to be exercised constantly in weaving one's way through the particularly tense human relationships which reflected the organizational and policy insecurities inherent in the administrative environment.

NOTE: Letters offering comments on Lyman Moore's contribution to housing and atomic energy were secured from Wilson W. Wyatt, Coleman Woodbury, William L. C. Wheaton, Charles S. Ascher, Betty Godfrey, and C. C. Ohlke. The writer was associated with Lyman Moore in both programs, as director of the Administrative Relations Division, NHA, 1943-46, and as special assistant to the general manager, AEC, 1946-48.

Lyman Moore measured up to these high demands. He brought broad interests to the job, developed in part out of his rich educational background (at the University of Wisconsin as an undergraduate student in the Experimental College under Meiklejohn and later as a graduate student at Wisconsin and Northwestern Universities). He brought an extraordinarily high quality of work experience gained in the International City Managers' Association and federal Office of Education, and as administrative assistant to the City Manager of Kansas City, Missouri, L. P. Cookingham. His broad philosophical and technical training combined with his work experience aided him greatly to establish rapport and gain the respect of his program associates who worked on the complex problems of housing policy in programming, finance, construction, and mortgage insurance. His particular competence in all the tools and art of administration made him the natural and fully respected leader of staff members in the managerial specialties. His unfailing good humor, faith in his fellows, confidence in getting the job done, and capacity to delegate responsibility endeared him to his associates—both program and managerial. These attributes made it possible for him to create a rare team spirit. This is best expressed by one of his associates who, in response to my request for comments on Lyman Moore's contribution, wrote:

I have found it very difficult to identify specific ideas or items in NHA's program that I could trace definitely to Lyman. Partly, no doubt, this is simply the result of the passing years. To a greater degree, however, I would attribute it to the fact that the NHA group in the Office of the Administrator was to an extraordinary degree a real team. Everything of any importance was discussed by practically all of us, and no one seemed to care or often even to know who brought it up first or was the most interested in it.

Although this makes your task more difficult, it does point to two of Lyman's finest qualities. He was a team man par excellence. And, although he had definite responsibilities in the Agency, as his title indicated, his influence and contributions were felt as much on the program as on the administrative policies. Offhand, I can think of no major program issue during the four years that we worked together

in which he was not interested and to which he did not make some contribution.¹

This team spirit was a nice admixture of several important ingredients: (a) the sheer fun in working together as human beings generously lubricated with Lyman's extraordinarily active sense of humor, (b) the highly professional standards for doing a sound technical job of administration which he inspired, and (c) the deep motivation for doing the job in the public interest which he shared. In summary, Lyman Moore was frank in his dealings with his associates, liberal in his political and economic views, broad in his orientation to the tools and purposes of administration, and deep in his faith and hopes for democracy.

Atomic Energy

OF NO less importance, but of an entirely different character, was Lyman Moore's contribution to the atomic energy program. This contribution was made after Lyman had returned, in 1946, to his first love and life work—city management. His contribution to the work of the Atomic Energy Commission was made with a phenomenally small expenditure of time: possibly 25 days of visits and consultations distributed over several years, starting in 1947. During this period Lyman was concerned with one of AEC's top managerial headaches, the management of AEC cities.

Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Hanford are the fourth, fifth, and seventh largest cities in the states of New Mexico, Tennessee, and Washington, respectively. These cities have provided the domiciles and community life of most of the citizens who ushered in the atomic age. They were anything but "normal" in their genesis and development. Operating costs, governmental policies, and managerial practices were shrouded in secrecy during the administration of the United States Corps of Engineers, organized as the Manhattan Engineering District. Lifting the veil of secrecy surrounding the operations of the cities provided members of Congress with the first major opportunity to express their very critical views on the management of the whole vast enter-

¹ Letter from Coleman Woodbury, formerly Assistant Administrator for Program; now Norton Professor of Regional Planning at Harvard University.

prise. No member of Congress had valid criteria or even notions as to how much a gaseous diffusion plant or nuclear reactor should cost, but many had criteria and specific ideas about how much a mile of asphalt pavement should cost, what schools should cost, and how many policemen per hundred citizens was generally considered adequate in communities of comparable size elsewhere in the United States.

The civilian Commission and its general manager, Carroll L. Wilson, appointed late in 1946, knew within a very brief time after taking on the job of redirecting the far-flung atomic enterprise that the management of the three cities was of the highest order of complexity and importance. No man in the United States was better equipped to advise the Commission on possible ways to reorient the policies and practices of these three cities toward normal American standards than Lyman Moore, for he combined in an unusual degree knowledge of federal administration and municipal administration.

From his conferences with AEC staff members in Washington, from his on-the-spot examination of the cities themselves, and from conversations with managers and other officials Lyman quickly assembled the pertinent facts necessary to create a framework of realistic thinking about the problems and possible solutions. His observations were summarized in a series of recommendations which became the Commission's policy objectives in 1948. Guiding the whole effort was the expressed intent of the Commission that "residents [of the three cities] shall enjoy those facilities, services, and activities which are properly a part of American community life." To give effect to this intent Lyman Moore's expert knowledge of city management and his reasoned judgment about practical measures which could be taken, at the proper time and in the right sequence, became the difference between a pious hope and the beginnings of an administrative reality. More specifically, he clearly formulated and persuasively presented policy objectives to cover: (a) the kind of accounting system which

would be necessary to produce reports on which management could make reliable judgments; (b) fiscal policies which would produce more revenue from commercial properties, housing rentals, and utilities; (c) separation of responsibility for local government from real estate operations; (d) measures to encourage private construction of houses and commercial properties; and (e) measures to increase financial responsibility of citizens and a "local organization that could be converted into a local government."

In addition to creating a framework of policy objectives which guided the later practical efforts of the AEC staff in Washington and in the cities, Lyman Moore contributed something possibly of even greater importance. Through the processes of formulating searching questions of policy for the Atomic Energy Commission, for residents of the cities, and for Congress and the federal taxpayer, he directly and indirectly undergirded the whole effort with philosophical reasonableness, professional assurances, and faith that the job of making these cities more nearly normal expressions of American democracy could and must be done.²

In his initiation of policies and administrative measures which have reoriented the management of the atomic cities to approach normal American standards; in his espousal of policies which greatly increased the financial participation of the residents in the cost of their governmental services after long experience in a featherbed of subsidy; and in his well-reasoned arguments and suggestions as to why these policies were sound, reasonable, and administrable, Lyman Moore was dealing with human problems quite as complex as the atom itself. There is good reason to believe that he started a "chain reaction" of hard thinking about the requirements and rewards of democratic life which will place him among the important men of the early atomic age.

² For a more complete account of the substance and results of Lyman Moore's contribution to atomic energy, see his article, "Democratic Local Government in AEC Communities," 7 *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 19-22 (January, 1951).

Lyman S. Moore as Consultant in Thailand

By EDMOND F. RICKETTS

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EXPERIENCE with United States foreign aid programs has increasingly emphasized the importance of strengthening the administrative institutions of those recipient nations whose traditions in self-government and in conducting extensive public services are relatively short. The assistance extended to such nations necessarily flows through local official channels, and its immediate and long-run usefulness is heavily influenced by the soundness of the administrative organization, the civil service, and the established ways of transacting governmental business.

The administration of foreign aid programs naturally has made United States representatives fairly familiar with local administrative problems and resources. In some countries, notably Greece, United States aid groups have been staffed to provide technical assistance in governmental management. In many, however, American knowledge of local administrative problems has been a loose collection of impressions gained in securing customs clearances, in organizing a demonstration program in the field of agricultural extension services, in equipping a hospital, or in accomplishing any other of the diverse objectives embraced within the mutual aid programs. Such contacts, however, do not serve to sort out the basic problems from the peripheral; and while they have acquainted Americans with local officials whose dedication to their duties is profound and whose talents are of the highest order, they have also revealed that these same officials have neither the time nor, in many cases, the perspective to identify the causes of poor administration or to formulate remedies and the order in which they should be applied.

Along with the recognition of the paramount importance of administrative improvement in realizing the optimum value from economic and military aid, and of the appropriateness of United States grants of technical assistance in furthering such improvement, there has come a growing realization of the need for an orderly approach to this objective. In some cases it has been sought by the addition of a public administration adviser to the aid mission's staff; in others, the initial phase of developing a program for improving public administration in the recipient nation has been entrusted to one man, to a team, or to an institution like Public Administration Service as a short-term undertaking, and the later phases have been carried on by the regular mission staff.

Lyman Moore's brief direct association with public administration in a foreign country was as a participant with the writer in a two-month reconnaissance survey, in March-May, 1952, of the administrative problems of the kingdom of Thailand. Thailand is the only nation of Southeast Asia which has retained its independence through the years in the face of western imperialism. An absolute monarchy until two decades ago, Thailand is still in some respects in transition to durable constitutional government. The government is parliamentary in form, and the executive power is exercised through the Council of Ministers which is answerable to the Parliament; half of the members of the Parliament are appointed and half are chosen in popular elections. The system of government is unitary rather than federal, and a high degree of centralization of authority has prevailed in the administration of public affairs. Thailand is predominantly agricul-

tural, its resources of farm and forest are considerable, and its population density low by the standards of China, India, and Japan. The recent governments of the kingdom have been particularly alert to the urgency of programs of social and economic betterment in their nation, bordered as it is by the troubled lands of Burma, Indo-China, and Malaya and but once removed, and only slightly so, from China.

The selection of Lyman Moore as a leading participant in a public administration mission to Thailand was natural. Despite his lack of prior study of or travel in Southeast Asia, his particular combination of professional background and achievement and personal traits made him ideally suited to the mission. He grew to maturity in a household marked by a deep sense of community obligation and an unusual breadth of interests; his undergraduate and graduate studies emphasized the nature of governmental institutions and their gradual evolution in response to special local circumstances and traditions; his alertness to the appropriateness of institutional differences among nations was strengthened and broadened by travel in Western Europe. As an assistant director on the secretariat of the International City Managers' Association he had acquired an intimate knowledge of the problems of diverse American cities, a knowledge he put to work with outstanding success in the practical settings of Kansas City, Missouri, Portland, Maine, and the Atomic Energy Commission communities. His federal experience included the prewar stability of the Office of Education and the hectic problems of the nation's wartime housing program. This background and an acute intelligence were excellently complemented by unusual personal traits: the personal warmth and integrity which invite and respect confidences from relative strangers as well as close associates; a ranging curiosity, tactfully and ingratiatingly displayed in Thailand on matters as different as the chesslike game the taxi drivers played while waiting fares and the more sensitive aspects of management problems within the Council of Ministers; and a remarkable feel for the core of a troublesome situation, whether it involved fractious personalities, poor organization, or inept ways of doing things.

It is possible that a catalog which accurately

listed the key problems of public administration country by country would reveal that most problems are common to most countries. The true measures of the soundness of a public administration reconnaissance survey and of the competence of the surveyor are in discovering both the unique and the special local significance of the commonplace, in judging the relative urgency of the areas of difficulty, in developing feasible and locally appropriate approaches to their resolution, and in presenting these findings and insights persuasively to responsible local officials.

It was in doing these difficult things that Lyman's unusual capacities had especial pertinence. Thailand's elaborate governmental machinery for planning and the widespread departmental activity in programming future accomplishments did not conceal the nation's essential lack of and most pressing need for effective capital budgeting for the government as a whole, supported by a small but skilled staff of advisers to the Council of Ministers in relating needs to resources. Procedural complexities and the profligate use of staff in accounting and budgetary control had less significance than the failure of the accounting system to produce timely information useful for managerial leadership and control or the handicaps for responsible administrators which inhered in the limitations on departmental spending authority. Inadequacies of revenue administration took on a manifold significance: widespread tax evasion was fostering a cynicism that hindered the growth of democratic institutions; the government was being deprived of badly needed revenues; uneven and ineffectual administration was warping or destroying whatever equity characterized the revenue structure; and the economic policy objectives of the revenue structure were being thwarted.

A practicing city manager might be expected to have some affection for home rule charters and the council-manager form of municipal government. Despite some local receptivity to such proposals and Lyman's personal views about the strong desirability of both for many cities in the United States, he did not need any reminders of the hazards of a nonselective transplanting of institutions. His approach to the problems of local government in Thailand

proceeded from convictions that the strength of the institutions of popular government is nourished by strong local government, that there are some things that are better done by a community for itself than by a remote central authority, and that the general government will benefit from experience gained in local politics and local administration. He recognized, however, that these benefits could be realized only gradually, and at different rates in different communities; that there would be a transitional period posing grave difficulties for central authorities and demanding a tolerance for local "mistakes"; that there were practical problems of making available sources of credit for municipal governments, altering the kingdom's revenue structure, and establishing a structure for local self-government; and that the rate of progress toward desirable ends would be uneven.

Problems of organizational structure exist so widely that there is a natural tendency to discover them even where they do not exist. Thailand's ministerial and departmental structure is simple and basically sound. The more important organizational questions in Thailand are the assignments of responsibility within the structure and the nature and volume of the flow of matters upward for decision—both in the central offices of the government and in the relationships of Bangkok with the districts and communities. Because

these questions were tied in closely with the composition and functions of the Council of Ministers, they were identified as matters which should be dealt with wholly by Thailand officials, an identification which came from Lyman's practiced knowledge of where the role of the consultant—particularly one who is a foreign though friendly national—ends and the field of responsibility of the local official inescapably takes over.

The ultimate tests of an administrative survey are the action taken on its recommendations by responsible officials and the results which follow from affirmative official action. It is, of course, too early to gauge the Thailand reconnaissance survey by these tests: governments everywhere have their own special problems in making major revisions of their administrative systems, and the government of a country whose very existence at times seems precarious must have especially difficult problems. The transmittal of the survey findings did, however, bring clear evidences of official receptivity, and recent reports indicate that implementing action is impending. These developments and the expressions of sympathy and of feelings of personal loss that have come to Lyman's family and American friends from his Thailand associates suggest that the record of his usefulness was consistent overseas as well as in his native land.

Legislative-Executive Relationships in Budgeting as Viewed by the Executive

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ACCORDING to the assignment given me in this series of lectures, I am supposed to present to you today some observations on legislative-executive relationships in budgeting from the angle of the executive branch. But I do not regard it as my job here to outline a particular institutional point of view. Unless we come to grips with the entire complexity of legislative-executive relationships, unless we free ourselves from the limitations of our own working experience, we shall not be able to reach useful conclusions.

As most of you know, it happens that my vantage point has been on the executive side. You may have to bear that fact in mind in considering my line of reasoning. Yet I myself would like to forget any particular angle and keep before me only what I know to be the requirements of effective government. These requirements are of great urgency at a time when the United States has assumed vast responsibilities not only for the welfare and security of the American people but also for the survival of freedom throughout the world.

I shall discuss first some of the controlling factors in legislative-executive relationships. Later, I shall deal briefly with some of the more recent proposals for strengthening Congress in its budgetary operations.

I

THE problem of legislative-executive relationships is frequently seen as the direct

NOTE: This article was one of the Jump-McKillop Lectures in Public Administration, given at the Graduate School of the United States Department of Agriculture, April 9, 1953.

and inevitable outgrowth of the separation of powers. It is true that the system of divided powers written into the Constitution in categorical language has no counterpart in any other political system. Nowhere else can one observe so sharp a distinction as is established by the Constitution in giving the legislative power to Congress and the executive power to the President as the embodiment of a coequal branch of government.

Still, it is easy to see that the separation of powers would be something quite different if it did not operate on the basis of an electoral system which fosters localism and pressure groups. The separation of powers would be something quite different if it operated under the influence of a party system which developed solidarities around general programs for governmental action—equally meaningful for the members of Congress and the President. In other words, those who simply lay the complications of legislative-executive relationships to the separation of powers see only part of the picture. The other and larger part comes to light in those factors of law and usage that make it difficult for Congress to function as a unified and self-directed institution.

To be sure, we have learned from experience that the most productive type of society is the kind of diversified society which exists in our country. A diversified society must reflect its divisions in the composition of the national legislature. If it were otherwise, it would be hard to see how democratic representation could be attained. What is important for my purpose here, however, is to suggest that the splintering effects of interest representation in

Congress run counter to the practical maxim that the business of governing makes necessary a unified structure.

In this matter, the executive branch, under the Constitution, is more satisfactorily organized. For reasons persuasive in their own day—and increasingly persuasive in our time—the Founding Fathers insisted upon unified direction of the executive business of the nation under a single Chief Executive. This arrangement has provided the executive branch with considerable capacity for compounding different interests into a working formula for the pursuit of the common good. Congress, on the other hand, has for the most part remained without suitable machinery for initiating and enforcing broadly balanced programs for the attainment of national goals.

In the light of these considerations, it becomes clear that legislative-executive relationships will continue to be molded by the stubborn realities of congressional-presidential government. The natural pulls and strains that run through a society of autonomous interest groupings will normally keep Congress and the President on different tracks. The basic reason, as I have tried to indicate, does not lie simply in the division of legislative and executive power. It lies in differences of political perspectives, which in turn are influenced by interest relationships. The political perspective of Congress is affected closely by the perspectives of its individual members, who have their political roots in their districts. The President's perspective is necessarily national, not local.

II

AGAINST this background the tested value of the national budget system stands out in a doubly impressive way. Here, in the annual formulation of a comprehensive work plan for the federal government, a bridge has been erected between the legislative and the executive branches. Thirty years ago the congressional architects of the Budget and Accounting Act found a means of cooperation which, as a basic governmental procedure, has been effective in a continuing way. Under this procedure, with the groundwork done in large measure on the executive side, Congress provided itself with a practical basis for instructing the departments annually about the programs to be

carried out and the scale of individual activities.

Development of the budget process has introduced significant refinements into congressional control over the executive branch. Legislation, of necessity, confers responsibilities and grants authorizations to departments in fairly general language. If an agency is directed to perform defined functions under law, it will still have wide discretion in determining how much or how little shall be done in the performance of each individual function. Budgeting is like a mechanism for pumping fuel into the engines of government. It reserves for Congress the full opportunity for saying, on a year-to-year basis, in what scope and at what rates of progress departments shall carry out their statutory assignments.

But budgeting is a bridge between the legislative and the executive branches also because it provides a method of reaching decisions of policy and administration in an orderly and informed way. Under the Budget and Accounting Act, the President was charged with the task of placing before the Congress each year a complete budget as the plan of work for the whole government. It was recognized clearly that the President alone had the constitutional standing to give a proposed budget the support of political responsibility. It was also recognized that he alone, as Chief Executive, was in a position to make available to Congress all the detailed technical information at his disposal throughout the executive branch. Congress, in turn, thus gained a stronger foundation for critical examination and final approval of the budget proposed by the President.

The importance of the Budget and Accounting Act as a milestone of responsible management has been pointed out frequently. Perhaps it is useful here to stress what I would like to call the constitutional significance of this legislation. This significance lies in the achievement of a durable procedure for cooperation between the legislative and the executive branches. This bond of cooperation is of ever-increasing consequence because the budget has emerged as the key document which controls the conduct of the entire business of the federal government.

The budget process as a procedure for co-

operation between the legislative and the executive branches gains its strength from three basic elements. As I see it, the first of these, though sometimes pushed into the background, is the mutual appreciation by both branches of the need for approaching the budget as a joint effort. Only when there is acceptance of the cooperative implications of budgeting can one expect the greatest benefit from the budget process. A second element is the full utilization of the President's responsibility as constitutional head of the executive branch for the budget he submits to Congress. The largest returns accrue to Congress when it helps to keep the exercise of the President's responsibility unimpeded. The third necessary element of the procedure is the free flow of budgetary information from the executive branch to Congress.

When I emphasize the value to Congress of the President's direct responsibility for the budget, I do not mean to suggest that the President would or should ignore the interests of his principal advisers—the heads of the executive agencies. In fact, the preparation of the budget in the executive branch is a large-scale and intensive operation which, at various points in the sequence of stages, brings into play the judgments of a large number of responsible operating officials. This is both good and inescapable. One reason for wide participation in budgetary decisions is the obvious fact that budget-making for the entire government is too big to be done by any agency singly, even when that agency is charged with explicit statutory responsibilities in the field, as is the Bureau of the Budget.

No less important is the fact that the President would hardly want to speak for the executive branch without being sure that he has tapped all the counsel available to him in his official family. In order to come forth with a well-considered budget, the President must place much reliance not only on the factual information but also on the evaluative judgments contributed by experienced and politically sensitive administrators. Consultation is essentially a way of give-and-take. In other words, although even the soundest advice is never automatically compelling upon the one charged with making the decision, nevertheless under normal circumstances he will not find it

easy to brush aside thoughtful advice once it has been supplied.

Moreover, as a knowing observer once put it, department heads, whether or not possessed of political ambition, may be conscious of standing in a competitive position to the President. They may show little solidarity with him on issues affecting their own agencies. It is clear, therefore, that the budget submitted by the President could fall apart in Congress if strong subordinates undertake to convey their opposition.

When the President presents Congress with his budget, he therefore submits a document that rests on many vital agreements. But he must retain and defend the integrity of decisions that result from his more inclusive field of vision. There is reasonable assurance in the operation of the budget process that the various special points of view within the executive branch find recognition, yet they cannot be allowed to run roughshod over the more general points of view typical of the level of the President.

In brief, the pressure within the executive branch for specialized functional objectives—as in the promotion of business, labor, agriculture, and a host of other fields—is met by a strong counterpressure in support of general solutions based on coordination. But reconciliation of positions is accomplished not by command but by a meeting of minds. It is not to be assumed, of course, that the end product is perfect. It is important that the end product come as close as possible to representing a general executive position, by and large accepted by all concerned.

One thing that is not understood widely is the degree to which the budget process, in compounding executive positions, at the same time brings to the fore the attitudes of interest groups and the tendencies likely to emerge in Congress. One reason is that the President is naturally anxious to come forth with a budget that will appeal to public opinion as well as to most of those who exercise influence in the political arena. As Chief Executive, interested in carrying out the government's program, the President is obviously more concerned with a practical work plan than with a propaganda document.

In addition, of course, the individual depart-

ments in most instances have fairly close relations with particular clienteles and individual committees or leading figures in Congress. As a result, consultation within the executive branch about the President's budget has also external aspects. Such consultation casts light not only on departmental preferences but also on the political scene, especially the trends of thought prevailing in Congress.

Thus the President, when making his final decisions on the budget, has the advantage of many different strands of information. He acts on the results of examination carried on in the first instance within the different departments, and subsequently on a broader scale by the Bureau of the Budget. All of this serves to relate governmental programs and performance to the needs of the next fiscal year. But the President also has before him a picture of the positions taken by interest groups and congressional committees, and of the currents of public opinion and general congressional sentiment as well. In this respect, the Bureau of the Budget will regard itself responsible for bringing to the notice of the President any congressional expressions of general budgetary policy, especially the views of the Appropriations Committees and other congressional committees having across-the-board responsibilities like those of the Budget Bureau itself.

Of course, there will always be occasions when the President feels duty-bound to press for the recognition of issues on which members of Congress may have a neutral or even a negative attitude. To draw the attention of Congress to these issues—including issues that do not enjoy universal popularity—is one of the burdens of statesmanship. It is at the same time an essential feature of congressional-presidential government. On the other hand, in order to foster the general interest as he sees it, the President needs to give thought to what support is likely to emerge for his proposals within the legislative branch.

As a staff agency of the President, the Bureau of the Budget exerts no direct influence in the legislative handling of the budget. Its indirect influence is confined to what it contributes toward a satisfactory presentation to Congress of information helpful particularly to the Appropriations Committees. One thing, however, should be remembered. The budget as sub-

mitted expresses the President's policy recommendations. The Bureau of the Budget is not meant to have a policy position of its own. Nor could the Bureau be expected, in view of its staff character, to depart from the policy positions of the President. What the Bureau is intended to do—and what it is reasonably well equipped to do—is to serve as a dependable source of interpretive as well as factual information.

Only in a secondary respect does the Budget Bureau move outside its informational role, and then only upon congressional demand. For example, the Bureau may be given specific authorizations under appropriation language to take care of certain minor budgetary problems, like approval of transfer of funds. On the basis of general law, the Bureau has the additional duty to report promptly on instances of departmental use of funds that would lead to deficiencies. Sometimes Congress has charged the Bureau with the task of determining reductions all across the executive map to meet a figure set by Congress in acting upon the President's budget. This, however, is a rather rare arrangement.

There are different ways in which the Budget Bureau provides Congress with information. In the first place, in accordance with the Budget and Accounting Act itself, the Bureau must furnish such information as is called for by any of the committees of Congress concerned with finance, whether revenue or appropriations. These requests fluctuate in number, and are usually more frequent during the period when the President's budget is in preparation and when things are getting ready for the hearings held by the Appropriations Committees.

Another customary form of making available to Congress the budgetary information of the executive branch is through testimony by the director or other officials of the Budget Bureau. The explanation of detailed budgetary requests before the Appropriations Committees is offered generally by the individual agencies; testimony by officials of the Budget Bureau usually centers upon matters of general significance for the executive branch as a whole or upon amplification of information previously supplied in the testimony of officials of individual agencies.

As may be expected, there are usually discussions between Appropriations Committee staff and staff of the Budget Bureau. These discussions, however, look to particular problems and respect the separate institutional responsibilities of the two branches under the Budget and Accounting Act. Special reports asked for by congressional committees are also transmitted from the Budget Bureau. Occasional details of Bureau staff to congressional committees and a considerable variety of informal staff contacts are further illustrations of the exchange of knowledge.

But in this whole picture I wish to refer especially to the Budget Bureau's role as the President's legislative clearinghouse. Under the legislative clearance procedure—established by the President at the suggestion of the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee in 1921—both congressional committees and executive agencies use the Budget Bureau to find out whether a specific legislative proposal is in accord with the program of the President. This procedure has the significance of a signal system by letting congressional committees and individual members of Congress know what the position of the executive branch is with respect to particular legislative proposals.

As I indicated earlier, the importance of the budget process as a method of regularized cooperation between the legislative and the executive branches should always be appreciated anew because it might otherwise too readily be taken for granted. I do not mind adding that in the protracted discussion of ways of improving legislative-executive relationships in the field of budgeting there is often too much of an implication of presumably serious deficiencies yet to be overcome. It would be better to begin with a thoughtful appraisal of the structure of relationships that has developed between the two branches since the adoption of the Budget and Accounting Act, and specifically during the past decade or so, in order to figure fruitfully what might be done further.

III

IT is in this light that I should like to touch briefly upon the innocent panacea that has been suggested off and on throughout the years—the idea of an “independent” Budget

Bureau. It is not too clear just how such independence could be guaranteed and what results might flow from it. It is obvious to me that this whole concept falls outside the frame of our congressional-presidential system of government, because an agency that was truly independent and that could make fundamental financial determinations binding on all other agencies would actually be politically irresponsible. There is implied in the concept of an independent Budget Bureau the exercise of a bureaucratic supremacy by a body of experts possessed of infallible judgment which they impose on all concerned. If the experience of the last three decades has made clear anything, it has been the wisdom of the congressional builders of the budget system in embedding the budget process in the structure of constitutional responsibility.

Another suggestion that has been made at times is for a congressional Budget Bureau. This might mean a transfer of the existing Budget Bureau to Congress. If it meant that, the proposal would entail grave weakness by bringing about three highly undesirable consequences. The first would be the divorce of budget preparation and budget administration from the judgment of the Chief Executive about what activities and what funds are needed for the effective conduct of the government's business. The second would be the destruction of the intimacy of the Budget Bureau's contacts with the wealth of detailed information now available to it within the operating services. The third would be the elimination in the budget process of that focal point for nationwide perspective and coordination which we possess in the Presidency. If, on the other hand, the idea of a congressional Budget Bureau meant an agency to serve as the congressional counterpart to the Budget Bureau as we have it now, the matter would reduce itself to a question of congressional staffing, especially of the Appropriations Committees. Such staffing, of course, must not lead to the result of having the same job done twice at different places.

The ideas of an “independent” Budget Bureau and of a congressional budget agency have both proved alluring to those who see a simple remedy to the tremendous increase in the size and scope of the budget during recent

years. No one would deny that this development has produced entirely new and challenging problems for Congress. Forty years ago, the annual expenditures of the federal government's were less than 700 million dollars, or about 2.5 per cent of the total national income. At this level, problems presented by spending, borrowing, and debt management were of a lesser order than they are today, when in a fiscal year the government takes more than 25 per cent of the national income. The federal budget at its present level is one of the most significant factors in the economic and social life of the nation.

I have always been impressed with the knowledge and understanding that many members of Congress, particularly those on the Appropriations Committees, apply to countless budgetary issues coming before them. Yet I feel that in approaching the budget, there is a tendency to get immersed in the complexity of its detail without first considering the broader determinations which have generally dictated the size and scope of the budget.

As I have suggested on previous occasions, the problem is twofold. First, there is the need for identifying and agreeing in Congress on the kind and amount of information that is required to evaluate the budget as a whole and its thousands of component parts. And second, there is the need for providing within the Congress the kind of arrangements that will insure the best use of this information.

With respect to the first part of the problem, I believe that there is a general misconception about the kind of information necessary to test the validity of the budget. The size and emphasis of the President's budget is not governed by a multitude of unrelated decisions on individual items and activities. The major determinant in any budget is whether a given activity should be conducted at all, and if so at what level. All decisions on individual activities must be made in the light of broader factors—primarily the expenditure and revenue outlook, the international scene, economic conditions, and provisions of existing law.

These are the kinds of questions the President faces again and again in the preparation of the budget. Long before detailed estimates are prepared by the agencies, the basic decisions have been reached which, together

with mandatory expenditures under existing law, control the broad outlines of the forthcoming budget. A forecast of changed economic conditions in relation to requirements of existing law, for example, may change the expenditure needs for veterans programs by more than \$1 billion. The same assumption applied to other programs, such as public assistance grants, can also add or subtract hundreds of millions in the expenditures of the federal government.

Certainly Congress, for its scrutiny of the budget, should have all the information that is needed to view independently and with full understanding the budgetary needs of the government. I am inclined to think, however, that this is not simply a matter of increasing the quantity of information to be placed before Congress. Rather, it is a matter of the relevance of information. That is to say, instead of knowing more about the lesser detail of individual budgetary proposals, Congress may want to know more about those matters, issues, and problems that govern the budget in its main elements and as a whole.

Three major types of congressional action affect the budget—authorizations, appropriations, and taxation measures. The authorizing bills are handled by the substantive committees. The appropriations are considered by the two Appropriations Committees. And taxation bills come before the Committee on Ways and Means in the House and the Committee on Finance in the Senate. Nowhere does Congress pull the whole picture together.

The repair of this situation is the motivation behind the idea of a joint committee on the budget. In its recent form, the proposal—going beyond the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946—would provide an investigative committee with staff to do for the Appropriations Committees the work which the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation now does for the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance. This arrangement would add to the facilities already at the disposal of the Appropriations Committees. While a joint staff might save overlapping and duplication between the two houses, I believe that the proposal would be successful only if the Appropriations Committees themselves came to the conclusion that they

want a joint staff and will use it. Actually, there is sharp division on this point.

My own criticism of the proposal from the point of view of equipping Congress with a method of evaluating fiscal requirements is that the projected role of the joint committee rests heavily on the expenditure side of the budget. It touches only very lightly on the two equally significant aspects of budgetary consideration—revenue requirements and authorizing legislation. The revenue side of the budget must be considered in relation to the expenditure side. Still more important, however, is the review of the fiscal effects—especially the effects upon subsequent budgets—of authorizing legislation, which is introduced and considered in every session of Congress. Such analysis is at present beyond the purview of the Appropriations Committees or any other single committee in either house.

Another idea is that of a single annual appropriation bill, as a sort of logical counterpart to the fiscal integration achieved in the budget submitted by the President. A more sweeping proposal, discussed at some length in recent years, would make a number of changes in existing budgetary practices and procedures. (1) It would enact into law as a statement of congressional policy the objective to balance the budget and provide for a reduction of the national debt under conditions of high employment, production, and purchasing power. (2) It would require that the annual economic reports of the President or the economic reviews of the Council of Economic Advisers set forth a four-year estimate of desirable levels of governmental expenditures and receipts. (3) It would give the President the item veto, exercised by most governors. (4) It would require that budget estimates transmitted to Congress be based on a consolidated cash statement. (5) It would require a separation in the budget of investment-type expenditures from operating expenditures and, in addition, four-year estimates of investment-type expenditures in appropriate detail. (6) It would provide for appropriations for major nonmilitary investment-type programs to be available for four years.

In the matter of a statutory "freeze" of fiscal policy, it might be questioned whether such policy can or should always be based on only

one or two major objectives. In time of war, for example, whether hot or cold, even though production and employment are high it may be impossible to balance the budget without such drastic tax increases that incentives to needed war production are impaired. Similarly, a statement of major objectives of fiscal policy should probably also take into account the need to meet essential levels of public service and to provide a balanced and equitable tax system.

As for four-year projections of desirable levels of expenditures and receipts in relation to the gross national product, experience in the Bureau of the Budget indicates that long-range estimates are an important and necessary step in developing better guides for fiscal policy. Many problems remain to be solved, however, before the present exploratory work reaches a stage which would warrant the establishment of a statutory requirement.

The increasing recognition by the public and Congress of the usefulness of consolidated cash totals has contributed to a better understanding of the economic significance of fiscal policy. While greater emphasis upon this approach to budget presentation is desirable, some limitations should perhaps be pointed out. Even in measuring the economic impact of the government's financial operations, presentation on a consolidated cash basis goes only part way. It does not, for example, differentiate between those expenditures or receipts which have immediate or pronounced effects on the economy and those which have not. Moreover, since fiscal policy cannot be based exclusively on economic considerations, more than one type of budgetary presentation is necessary as a guide for policy decisions. There is no single "all-purpose" classification or presentation of budgetary facts which will meet all the needs of the Congress, the President, and the operating agencies.

With respect to a separation of operating expenditures from capital and other investment expenditures, the Budget Bureau has long recognized the need for a budget classification which would identify expenditures of an investment or similar character. A special analysis published for the first time in the budget for 1951 was presented as an experimental effort to provide a tentative new classification of expenditures according to the duration and na-

ture of benefits flowing from them. Improved data have since then become part of the budget document. One of the major problems is, of course, the definition of investment and similar expenditures.

Four-year availability of appropriations for investment programs may encourage advance planning and may allow the executive branch greater flexibility in timing expenditures for these programs in the light of changing economic conditions. Orderly planning of advance commitments for such investment programs is one of the most difficult but most important objectives to achieve.

The most important and the most controversial of the proposals for budgetary reform is the item veto. There have been differences of opinion on whether a constitutional amendment would be required to give the President this power or whether legislative action would be sufficient. The need for the item veto is increased in case Congress makes use of the so-called omnibus appropriation bill, as it did in 1950. A single appropriation bill magnifies the problem of legislative riders on appropriation acts. The experience in 1950 with the consolidated appropriation bill strengthens my belief that a single bill is fertile ground for the inclusion of legislative riders, despite restrictions in the Senate and House rules relating to legislation in appropriation bills. As a practical matter, therefore, it would be better to provide for the item veto before action is taken to consolidate appropriations into one bill. Unfortunately, the probabilities of successful legal attacks upon the item veto when it is based simply on legislative rules seem somewhat greater with respect to riders than with respect to appropriation amounts.

IV

SO MUCH for some indication of the nature of proposals advanced in recent years to strengthen further the legislative-executive relationships which have developed with such remarkable consistency under the Budget and Accounting Act. As I conclude, I seem to end up with four principal points.

First, only a Utopian would imagine that the underlying factors of congressional-presiden-

tial government would yield to mere procedural elaborations of the budget process. A significant improvement in legislative-executive relationships must cut more deeply. Here the critical question is how Congress itself looks upon the way it is organized internally for asserting its institutional identity and unity.

Second, there is nevertheless wide agreement that room exists for improving procedures in legislative-executive operations in regard to the budget. In fact, in matters of management nothing should ever be regarded as the last word on how a thing is to be done. Complacency in this matter is a dangerous narcotic. But I am far from sure that all the implications of each proposal for improvement brought forth during these past years have been examined with sufficient care. Nor do I feel that it would be in the interest of good government to enact proposals into inflexible statutory requirements when cautious experimentation appears a more fruitful course. Above all, the reservations about many of these proposals expressed in the Appropriations Committees certainly deserve respectful attention.

Third, it might be well for me to refer in this context to the pioneering activities of the joint accounting project, which was undertaken with strong congressional support by the General Accounting Office, the Treasury Department, and the Bureau of the Budget. What we need perhaps is some such joint project to explore with care the field I have discussed here, with continuing participation of the Appropriations Committees and of other committees of Congress. No one could know what would be the outcome, but it might help to clear the air.

And fourth, in whatever is done we should be a little closer to earth than we have been so often of late and firmly reject the implication that this or that innovation will in itself produce telling economies. The reckless overselling of ideas is one of the less satisfying aspects of the political process. When it comes to significant economies, no device and no mechanism can automatically do the trick. This is a matter of unwavering determination of priorities—and the resistance to such priorities is spread all over the political landscape.

Observations on Public Welfare in Puerto Rico

By ELIZABETH WICKENDEN

Consultant in Public Welfare

LET me begin this communication to my public welfare friends in Puerto Rico, and their friends everywhere, with a disclaimer. I do not claim to be an expert of any kind, but I most fervently hope I am not that new by-product of the miracle of air travel, the "hit-and-run expert." This is the person who, necessarily cautious of judgment at home where he has long lived with the elusive complexity of reality, becomes impetuously omniscient in a new setting where he is not burdened with restraints of knowledge and experience. Today, with our postwar emphasis on spreading technological benefits throughout the world, the visiting "expert" is often a specialist in one of the myriad techniques necessary to the functioning of highly organized modern society. Even a field like social work, in which techniques are necessarily subordinate to social organization, has its technical missionaries roaming the world. But the hit-and-run expert—as opposed to the really useful visitor, expert or otherwise—is the one who, feeling ill at ease in an alien culture, jumps to speedy conclusions and departs before he is faced with the necessity of adapting his thinking to the realities of a new social setting.

These discursive observations are not unrelated to this effort on my part to set down a few of the ideas that have come to me as a result of my own all-too-short visit to Puerto Rico. I was fortunate to be able to spend about two weeks observing public welfare in Puerto Rico, meeting with its staff members in central, district, and local offices and talking with officials in other government departments. I came to Puerto Rico, not as an expert in any of the techniques of public welfare administration, but rather as a student of its basic philosophy,

the "why" rather than the "how" of what we do. For the past two years I had been working with public welfare officials throughout the United States and Canada, in my capacity as secretary to the Committee on Welfare Policy of the American Public Welfare Association, in an effort to reduce to writing the common denominator of thinking on the basic principles of public welfare. It was this draft version of a "Statement of Principles," now officially adopted by the APWA, which served as the framework for discussions with public welfare officials in Puerto Rico.

General Observations

THE first thing that must be noted about public welfare in Puerto Rico is the miracle of its very existence. No such program, for example, exists in any country of Central America, where governmental participation in social welfare is still limited to elementary institutional care and where the very poor survive solely by reason of their generosity to each other. Within Puerto Rico itself the pressure which a rapidly expanded population exerts on extremely limited resources severely restricts the margin of production on which social welfare expenditures depend. The role of public welfare can only be appraised realistically when the hard fact is taken into account that those who do not produce can only be supported when the producers do not consume their entire product. In Puerto Rico this margin of surplus is precarious because of the race between expanding production and expanding population.

It is the very harshness of these economic realities that makes the rapid advance of public welfare in Puerto Rico so extremely impres-

sive and its social values so poignantly evident. The miracle of Puerto Rican public welfare is a direct corollary of the two basic characteristics of contemporary Puerto Rico as they appear to the sympathetic visitor. The first is the high social idealism which holds every human being to be of infinite inherent worth. The second is the heroic economic effort to wrest from unpropitious natural resources the wherewithal to support such a social philosophy. Public welfare acts as a support for both; it is concrete evidence of the concern of government for the welfare of the individual and it serves as catalytic agent in the great economic effort and adjustment being exacted of individuals for the common good. It does, however, create a real problem in governmental policy in the sense that idealism must be tempered by economic judgment if welfare expenditures are not to run away with the insular budget. Public welfare personnel, while recognizing this basic economic limitation on their program, need not, however, underestimate the contribution of public welfare to the total forward effort of the Island. It is, in fact, this contribution—even more than obvious humanitarian considerations—that justifies the heavy investment of insular funds in the public welfare program.

Sheer economic necessity obliges social workers and others concerned with public welfare in Puerto Rico to think of the program as much in terms of its total economic and social effect as of its benefits to the particular individuals aided. Public welfare has its rightful place in the total range of programs designed to advance the welfare of the people of the Island. But economic salvation on a case-by-case approach is obviously impractical in an economy which does not yet provide a standard of living of minimum adequacy, by the definition of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, for a large part of the total population. A welfare program geared to the assurance of such a standard of living to individuals seeking public aid would quickly drain the entire economy, while not even the most skilled "casework" could right the problem which exists between individuals living in such circumstances and the society of which they are a part. In such a setting public welfare must seek its justification, its philosophy, its methods, and its goals in the

role it plays in advancing the welfare of the total population. It cannot choose to stand guard over that group of people for whom it has assumed responsibility, fighting for their welfare against the rest. It must take the far more painful and heroic role of facing up to the total problem of poverty in all its agony and bitterness.

Without this kind of social orientation, public welfare in a tight economy faces dangers at the two extremes. On the one hand sentimental humanitarianism, conceivably supported by equally unrealistic political pressures, could force welfare expenditures to a level which would be economically unsupportable and would thus destroy the economic, social, and political base of the program. On the other hand equally unrealistic conservatism could lead to the conclusion that all welfare expenditures are a luxury which an economy like that of Puerto Rico cannot yet afford. This second point of view, in my opinion, is not only needlessly ruthless but reveals a lack of understanding of the social role of public welfare in an expanding economy. This is especially true in Puerto Rico where people are endeavoring to accomplish in one generation an economic feat that might well take centuries under normal evolutionary processes or might never happen at all.

Puerto Rico's success or failure is important not only to its own people but also to the millions of people living in underdeveloped areas throughout the world. Similarly the successful adaptation of its public welfare program to the needs of economic and social progress points the way for public welfare in the struggle against poverty throughout the world. This is an extremely important contribution to the development of social work thinking, especially now that this too has become an exportable commodity, and should not be too rigidly bound to doctrines evolved in other times and conditions.

The deliberate effort to conquer poverty and ignorance through democratic methods is a form of collective heroism. Totalitarian countries can expand their productive base and control their population by the simple expedient of forcing the adjustments involved through terror and the liquidation of those who do not conform or adjust. Democracy must carry all

its people along through enthusiasm, education, a sense of participation and fair sharing of both burden and benefit, evidences of progress, and supportive services where needed. Public welfare provides the ultimate supportive services; when all else fails it is the underpinning safety net. As with other safety nets its major value lies not so much in saving those that fall as in the courage it gives to those who, thus reassured, do not fall. People who grudgingly look upon public welfare as a necessary evil, required to sustain the weak, fail to take into account the reassurance and strength it gives to those who still travel unaided the hard road of modern life.

People who live in a primitive society can still afford to rely chiefly on family and neighbor for this sense of security. But as soon as the organization of production begins to move into the broader, more complicated structure required by modern techniques, the concept of mutual support must also widen to include the entire community. This is particularly true during the period of transition when people are being asked to give up the security of old ways in order that the whole community may prosper. While other agencies of government struggle to eliminate such basic causes of poverty as inadequate industrial development, inefficient agricultural organization and methods, illiteracy, and bad health and environmental conditions, public welfare struggles to extend the assurance of immediate social support to individuals along the way. The total movement is forward, and those who sustain courage from the rear are as essential to such a crusade as those who point the way to the fore. The fact that the method of public welfare involves aid to the individuals who comprise society in no way changes the companion fact that its function serves the most basic common purpose of all society: mutual protection and progress through mutual aid.

The Specific Contributions of Public Welfare

I WAS impressed during my visit to Puerto Rico with the many ways in which its public welfare program seemed to be aiding the total multifaceted effort of the government to eliminate poverty, ignorance, and inequality of opportunity. Even though these are all aspects of the one basic social role already discussed, it

seems convenient to elaborate on this role in terms of four closely related functions.

Public welfare brings the government close to the individual whatever his problem. To me the most remarkable achievement of public welfare in Puerto Rico is the fact that a friendly accessible office of *Bienestar Público* lies within walking distance of every individual on the Island. This is tangible evidence that the government, of which the welfare worker is one human agent, is accessible to his problem—whether the problem be large or small, classifiable or unique, susceptible of solution or just more easily borne when shared.

In visiting two of these local public welfare offices and in talking with the local chiefs from all of them, I was impressed by the fact that no problem is treated as irrelevant to the concern of public welfare. I realize that this elastic concept of public welfare is extremely difficult to interpret and can be very disturbing to literal-minded experts in public administration who prefer sharply defined functions which can be fitted neatly into the boxes of organizational and functional charts. But it is the very essence of public welfare to be "residual," to pick up the pieces for government where all its other programs leave off. This concept of public welfare puts a very heavy burden on the local worker; he must not only be fully informed regarding all the other programs of his community but he cannot, like his opposite number in the local employment or public health office, say to those who bring him the many insoluble problems of a still poor society: "Your problem lies outside my province. You go on over to *Bienestar Público* and see what they can do for you." He is the last point of call; he is the soldier in the front-line trench, holding the line for the government against the loneliness of poverty, suffering, and individual disaster as best he can. It seems to me that he, and I realize that "he" is more frequently "she," is not only a very important part of the total government structure but also one whose essential heroism, here as elsewhere, is not always fully recognized or appreciated.

Chiefly as illustration of the value of this link between government and individual I would like to cite a few of the kinds of problems which local public welfare chiefs described to me as coming to their offices. First, of course,

is the problem of economic need which I discuss in the next section. Then there are those who need a specialized service but do not know how to go about getting it, or need some help in getting it: the person who needs to go to the district hospital, the worker who feels he has been cheated by his boss but does not know that he has legal rights which the labor office will help him secure, the veteran or his dependents entitled to a benefit, the worker newly confronted with the esoteric mysteries of old-age and survivors insurance. Then there are those faced with the difficult social and economic by-products of migration, their own or those of a member of the family; with the particularly baffling problems presented by children, their own and others, in a period of rapid social change; with the unfamiliar demands of industrialization; or simply with the complications of widening horizons—a letter to be read, translated, or interpreted, a form to be filled out, advice or information about other parts of the world to be sought. There are those who come with a crying need for some specialized service that does not yet exist, hoping that the public welfare office will—as it has so often done in the past—find a way, make a beginning in a new social service.

No one would maintain that even the best trained local welfare worker could hope to resolve all the miscellany of problems that an open-door policy brings to his office. As social organization becomes more complex, however, the existence of a central point for information, referral, and guidance becomes increasingly necessary. The welfare worker, if he is to do his job well, needs to be not only sympathetic and understanding toward those who come to his office but well informed on the total range of economic and social developments in his region. Thus the welfare office helps to lubricate the whole social machinery. But more important than these practical results is the evidence that these problems are not forgotten, that there is someone to hear, that the government listens, assimilates, and ultimately, if possible, acts. During a period of transition this kind of holding action is particularly important. The welfare office not only tries to help the individuals who come to it with problems; it can likewise report and interpret these problems back through the official channels of gov-

ernment. Thus the link between government and individual becomes a two-way channel, an important artery in the life stream of a working democracy.

Public welfare equalizes the economic burden of support for the nonproducing members of society and is therefore a tangible evidence of democracy. In a poor and relatively primitive society without any provision for public assistance the full burden of support for the aged, ill, orphaned, or unemployed falls upon their relatives and neighbors. This means that those living closest to the margin of self-support carry virtually the whole burden of dependency, thus widening the gap of class privilege. Such a system carries the mark of a colonial or caste psychology in which the mass of people are considered to belong to a class apart, entitled neither to enjoy nor to hope for the blessings of the privileged. Moreover, it is feasible only in an agrarian static economy; industrial economic development demands a widening of the base of mutual aid and security. Even a low standard of assistance, supported by a progressive tax system, tends to equalize the burden of dependency, raise the standard of the poorest groups, and give practical support to the promise of democratic belief in equality of opportunity and responsibility.

While the existence of a public assistance program in Puerto Rico is basic to its total social program, there is no denying that it raises extremely difficult problems. Most of these are related to the question of its cost and the charge it creates against the total economy. Again, caution is needed to avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of extremes. All persons of good will, and certainly all social workers, would like to see the level of assistance payments, which in turn constitutes the level of income below which people become eligible for assistance, based on the actual minimum needs of people for adequate food, clothing, shelter, and the means to participate in community life. But obviously in an economic setting which does not yet provide this full level of living for most of those who are self-supporting, it is impossible to consider people's actual needs as the final determining factor in the assistance level. Public assistance has a very important social role, but its purpose is not to raise the

general standard of living, or even that of individuals, except in the most unusual circumstances. On the other hand it is equally unrealistic economic thinking to assume that the absence of a tax-supported public assistance program means that the problem of dependency has ceased to exist and does not constitute a charge against the total economy. Only in a society like that of some Eskimo tribes where the old people, the surplus girl babies, and the hopelessly disabled are deliberately killed can such an economic theory be advanced. Economic planning in a democratic setting must take into account the total population, the total income available for its support, and the most equitable way to divide this income in order to meet the needs of all.

This problem is particularly complicated in Puerto Rico for a number of reasons. Social and economic planning on the Island is focused to a very large extent around the "Operation Bootstrap" concept, the conviction that this relatively small area can only support its large population by a deliberate effort to expand its production, especially through the development of new industries. But industrial development requires capital and to a considerable extent it has been necessary for the government itself to provide this capital from the Island's own resources. Thus the problem of dividing the income of the Island is not only one of finding a fair division between various groups of consumers, including those dependent on public assistance, but also of making the most far-sighted possible division between immediate consumption and deferred consumption in the form of new factories and other means to industrial expansion.

A second factor in the solution of Puerto Rico's economic problems is the migration, temporary or permanent, of Puerto Rican workers to jobs on the mainland. This helps to relieve some of the pressure of a growing population and undoubtedly results in a flow of outside dollars into the Island economy. But it also creates particular problems for public assistance since it is chiefly the able-bodied workers who migrate. The Puerto Rican economy, the Puerto Rican educational system, supports those young people through the nonproductive years of their childhood only to lose the benefits of their producing years. Naturally those

who remain behind contain a disproportionate number of the aged, the children, and the handicapped who make up the bulk of the public assistance caseload.

These problems are acute in Puerto Rico but they are by no means unique. They also exist in very similar form in the Southern states. Here, too, the same problems—lesser in degree but similar in kind—of over-population, out-migration during the productive years, and a deliberate effort at industrial expansion have created heavy assistance loads. It is chiefly the fact that these poorer states must bear the heaviest social burdens which has led to the increasing federal financial participation in public assistance and other social programs. Here too, however, Puerto Rico's problem is complicated by its unique relationship to the federal government and the fact that the federal aid which it receives for assistance, is so much less proportionately than that received by the states. Now that Puerto Rico has achieved through its new Constitution formal liberation from any lingering taint of colonial status, it may be hoped that a more clear-cut recognition of the entitlement of its people as United States citizens to the same degree of federal aid extended to United States citizens living in the states will be possible.

In the meantime the maintenance of public assistance, even at its present low levels, is important evidence of the good faith of the government toward all its citizens. Beggary and poorhouses and reliance on the generosity of the poor are all attributes of a social system based on caste. In this sense public assistance is itself part of the bootstrap operation, the struggle of a poor country to achieve democracy by a fair sharing of its burdens as well as its rewards.

Public welfare serves to facilitate the individual adjustments exacted by a developing economy. There are many evidences of the ways in which public welfare helps to facilitate the wrenching adjustments required of those who need to change their way of making a living, to move, to modify their way of life, or to abandon old habits or ideas in the total community interest. Some of these have already been suggested in the discussion concerning the value of a network of accessible local public welfare offices. A developing economy holds

out to its people the inspiration and hope of high goals, but it also asks much of human beings who often find it hard to leave the relaxed security of old ways. This is particularly true in a land where the climate and the cultural tradition both contribute to a wonderful capacity for enjoying life as it comes. One of the impressive things to me about the present struggle in Puerto Rico is the effort to translate this zest for life into economically and socially creative channels. The industrial revolution of Puerto Rico has about it none of the dour quality of the Lancaster cotton mills. It has gaiety, enthusiasm, and pride which are as much natural resources as the long growing season and beneficent daily rain.

Those who take a poor view of the human race are freely vocal these days in expressing alarm lest public welfare soften the backbone, demoralize the fiber of those it serves. There is in this point of view a strong residue of the belief that poverty and social hardship are a kind of punishment visited upon the undeserving. We need be neither apologetic nor defensive in our disagreement with this nihilistic attitude. The very purpose of all social organization is to make life pleasanter, safer, and more rewarding for those thus joined together. It is the worried, anxious people who are afraid to make changes, who cling to the security of old ways, who do not free their energies for the productive task at hand.

Puerto Rico has found a variety of ways to apply social welfare concepts to the process of facilitating social change. Social workers are scattered through the Land Authority, the Migration Service, the community education program, the public health program, the public housing program, and the school system. But public welfare, because of its ubiquitous and comprehensive character, is also important not only in supporting these other more specialized services but in picking up where they leave off. Public welfare already performs many social services for those involved in migration and might well, in cooperation with the Migration Service, develop this relationship on a basis of planned sharing of responsibility. Public welfare can and does, in a limited sense, perform for the towns the same function of stimulating social organization and self-help which the Land Authority performs in the Title V

communities and the community education program performs in the rural *barrios*. Public welfare has assisted the program of vocational education in helping to direct people toward the needed skills. Public welfare has assisted and supplemented the program of vocational rehabilitation in helping people secure treatment or aids, such as glasses, needed for available employment. Public welfare has served as a source of advice, information, and orientation for new employers in dealing with community, family, and other social questions. This can, or should, be a particularly important function when the employer and his managerial aides come from the mainland and may not be completely familiar with Puerto Rican customs and psychology. Without in any way minimizing the importance of public assistance it is surely in these service fields that the great challenge to public welfare, not only in Puerto Rico but everywhere, now lies.

Public welfare contributes to developing a more responsible citizenry by placing the value of public recognition on the worth of every individual. It is obvious that this, the basic purpose of all public welfare, cannot easily be distinguished from the functions already described. But it is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in a welfare function not yet specifically discussed, that of child welfare. Child welfare removes from the accident of birth and family relationship the sole chance of a child for healthy growth and development. It does not remove from the family its responsibility for the welfare of its children; rather, it places around this inner sanctum of family strength a wider circle of supporting community protection. The very fact that the government concerns itself with the protection of children and other helpless individuals contributes to the social climate in which individuals can achieve maturity, growth, and self-reliance.

This emphasis on social climate is not intended to minimize the value of individual guidance and education. The two are, in fact, mutually contributory. The mother of a delinquent or a retarded or otherwise maladjusted child, knowing that the government is concerned with helping her meet a staggering problem, takes new heart in her hard task. The recently bereaved widow or widower can find courage in the concern public welfare shows

for the welfare of the children involved. The fact that the orphaned and abandoned are not left exclusively to the conscience and generosity of neighbors does not in any way diminish that conscience and generosity; it places the bulwark of community concern and responsibility behind all individuals and their concern for each other.

Inevitably the value placed on all human life, and especially upon the welfare of children, by public welfare as the agent of the community reflects itself in a more responsible attitude and a higher standard in the rearing of children on the part of all. This is probably the most fundamental problem confronting the world today and here again Puerto Rico is in a position to lead the way. For despite differences of opinion as to method, there is certainly little disagreement that world poverty cannot be conquered until the joy and pride of the human race in the begetting of children is broadened to include an equal concern for their rearing to healthy maturity. Puerto Rico, through its remarkable public health program, has moved far out ahead of those countries where parents must expect the heartbreak of losing half their children before their first birthday. But the heavy public assistance loads are themselves evidence of a kind of population pressure on economic resources which cannot be ignored. Fortunately there is historical evidence that a rising standard of economic and social valuation on human beings tends toward ultimate stabilization of population. Public welfare is an indispensable part of such valuation and so helps to speed the slow unwinding of human social evolution.

But beyond this practical problem of population lies the very essence of public welfare, its emphasis on the essential dignity of every human being. I find myself returning repeatedly to this then because it is so inescapable in every public welfare function. Again and again in Puerto Rico I was reminded that there are really only two basic attitudes of people toward each other. First there is the caste attitude, of which colonialism is one product, that limits the range of identification. For people who think in these terms the world consists of

two kinds of human beings: those who belong to their own group and are thereby endowed with their own feelings, needs, and privileges and those who lie beyond the pale, alien and "inferior." Second there is the democratic attitude (and I regret that popular oratory has so depreciated the word "democratic" without leaving us any adequate replacement) that is able to achieve a sense of identification, of common humanity with the total human race. In such an attitude there is no place for the "we" and "they" kind of thinking which finds it easy to rationalize differences of opportunity, status, and dignity by denying the essential humanity of the submerged group. Public welfare is not only committed by its very nature to the camp of democracy; it is also essential to its functioning as a social system by the recognition of common humanity and basic dignity it extends to individuals at their point of greatest vulnerability.

I realize that the government of Puerto Rico reaches out to its people in many ways, but at no point does it come closer to the naked heart of its essential humanity than through the program of public welfare. Just as a chain depends for its strength upon its weakest link so, in a sense, the faith of a people in its government springs from the way it treats its citizens in their time of greatest need. This is, in fact, one of the measures of advancing civilization. Puerto Rico can well be proud of its rapid advance to the front ranks in man's long struggle to achieve a civilization in which brute competitive strength does not determine for the individual either his survival or his opportunity.

Public welfare is an exacting and often heartbreaking occupation. It requires great courage to face, day after day with unflinching compassion, the realities of human suffering. But it is perhaps well to remind ourselves that there is one evil in the world worse than the suffering bred of poverty. This ultimate evil is hopelessness. Public welfare is a function of hope: it is born of faith and it breeds courage. Public welfare workers need to foster above all that courage and faith and hope on which their usefulness depends.

A Code of Ethics as a Means of Controlling Administrative Conduct

By Phillip Monypenny

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THE recent surge of popular interest in the standards of administrative conduct has its parallels in the work of students and practitioners of administration. During an earlier period the academic students of government were often skeptical of the usefulness of any deliberate effort to set out standards of administrative ethics. Among nonacademic observers there has always been a great deal of skepticism that any other standard than the crudest conception of self-interest was active in the world of politics and government. A distinguished Jefferson City correspondent of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* once assured the writer, then working on a thesis on personnel standards in state government, that no one ever got a job in state government unless somebody got something out of it. But of late there has been a growing interest among the academic specialists in the values that determine administrative actions—an interest obviously related to a study of the ethical purposes that administrative activity serves.¹ The British writers on the civil service have always paid explicit attention to the high ethical standards of their own civil servants and Fritz Morstein Marx in a study of the German civil service before Hitler stressed the ethical standards of the service and the means of enforcing them.² A similar in-

terest in ethical standards among writers in administration is fairly recent in the United States. The high point in popular interest has undoubtedly been the publication of the report and hearings of the Douglas subcommittee on governmental ethics.³ The work of that subcommittee has already produced two volumes on the same general subject, one by its chairman, one by the head of its research staff.⁴

This paper has another purpose than to go over ground so ably covered before. Both in the subcommittee report and in the hearings there is a suggestion that a code of ethics might be a useful thing for governmental officers generally and for administrative employees in particular. The subcommittee even proposed a commission to draw up such a code and to apply disciplinary standards on the basis of it. During the hearings, a number of witnesses were asked to comment on the possibility of such an undertaking and did so; most of them distinctly favored it.

A measure of skepticism seems in order with respect to the changes in administrative conduct that would result from such a code. There are statutes already on the books which prohibit some of the transactions most subject to

¹ Wayne A. R. Leys, *Ethics for Policy Decisions; The Art of Asking Deliberative Questions* (Prentice-Hall, 1952), 428 pp.; Paul Appleby, *Morality and Administration in Democratic Government* (Louisiana State University Press, 1952), 261 pp.; Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), 582 pp., Ch. 3.

² H. E. Dale, *The Higher Civil Service of Great Britain* (Oxford University Press, 1941), 232 pp.; Fritz Morstein Marx, "Civil Service in Germany," in Leonard D. White and others, *Civil Service Abroad; Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany* (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1935), pp. 161-275.

³ *Ethical Standards in Government*. Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print (United States Government Printing Office, 1951), 89 pp.; *Establishment of a Commission on Ethics in Government*, Hearings before a Subcommittee to Study Senate Concurrent Resolution 21 of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (United States Government Printing Office, 1951), 577 pp.

⁴ Paul H. Douglas, *Ethics in Government* (Harvard University Press, 1952), 114 pp.; George A. Graham, *Morality in American Politics* (Random House, 1952), 337 pp.

public censure. Would not a code of ethics be just another official pronouncement without any force of itself to secure the standards which it develops? There are reasons for believing, however, that under appropriate circumstances a deliberately formulated ethical code might be of use in controlling administrative conduct, that it might result in another standard of conduct than would be achieved by the spontaneous development of individual or group standards among administrative personnel.

This paper is addressed to the possible differences between a situation in which any standards that develop arise out of the unguided adjustment of individuals to each other, and to the environment in which the agency works, and the situation in which there has been a deliberate attempt to formulate standards. If there are differences, then an ethical code may function as a control device and not simply as a pious declaration.

If we take a situation in which a number of persons are participating in various decisions of some consequence for persons inside and outside an agency, we may assume a number of factors that enter into the decisions that are made. Some of these factors will be deliberately controlled by those who take the responsibility for controlling the work of the agency. There will be a division of labor, a system of authority, standard procedures, and the orderly presentation of grounds of decision, both factual and nonfactual—and implicit in the nonfactual, which we may call agency policy, the values to be maximized in the decisions taken. But there is obviously an area not subject to deliberate control, except as the selection of the staff may have determined some of the characteristics of staff members which affect their work. The decisions reached by individuals on the basis of even the most careful control of the factors supposed to affect decision-making will not ordinarily be identical. There will be standards present peculiar to individuals and there will be a group standard evolving—and these are only partially within the control of the superior officers of the agency. Actions taken may vary considerably from formal prescriptions.

The departure of decisions from the formal standards set out in agency regu-

lations is not easily controlled through supplementary means of exercising authority. Only a relatively small number of decisions may be reexamined to see whether the specified grounds account for the result or whether others seem to have entered. Those in authority cannot oversee directly the work that finally embodies the agency purposes, except in the very smallest agencies. They must act through others, and these through still others. Great reliance must ordinarily be placed on the immediately-undirected compliance of many individuals with the agency standards of action. To reduce the area of uncertainty there has been a considerable elaboration of measurement of all kinds—unit cost taking, statistical reporting, and other means of discovering indirectly whether the authorized standards are being followed. But in the end the informal standards are known only to those who are applying them.⁵

Suppose, however, that an attempt is made to set up a code of ethical conduct, thus attempting to deal by definition with some of the intangibles that are not easily included in official regulation. Such a code will be a body of statements containing grounds for decision of somewhat general applicability. It will specifically exclude certain grounds of decision. It will codify the implicit assumptions of disinterestedness and devotion to official policy not expressed in official regulations. It will have no legal effect, since we assume that it serves another purpose than rules and regulations. To be sufficiently specific to be a reliable guide, it will probably have to be based on the operations of particular administrative units. Thus, it may have a meaningful content with respect to the ordinary run of decisions. But even if it is assumed that it embodies the virtues of specificity and practicality, will it not be a set of statements like official rules and regulations endorsed by higher authority as an appropriate guide to conduct, but not necessarily accom-

⁵ Once the author was an unimportant unit in a chain of communications relaying reports on ammunition stocks to higher headquarters. It was at the end of the war and the figures were always the same. Then during a period of unusual alertness, battalions were ordered to inventory their ammunition and make good the deficiencies needed to come up to combat readiness. There was a tremendous requisitioning, though there had been no previous indication of shortage.

panied by appropriate activity? Is there anything which will translate such formulas into action? Is there any system of sanctions more effective than the cumbersome sanctions that may attend formal violation of regulations?

In ordinary discussions, ethical standards are often treated as peculiarly personal, like habits of bathing or table manners. You either have them, or you don't. A person measures up, or he does not. A standard may be stated, but only the individual himself can bring about the transition within himself suggested by acceptance. Conformance to a code is a matter of conversion that takes place from the inside. If this is so, then the only value in an ethical code, whether general or particular, is to present a more explicit statement of good conduct than might otherwise be obtainable. In the degree that it is explicit it may be a better vehicle for achieving conversion than the example of others and the implicit expectations of the other actors on the scene. If conversion takes place, action will follow. But obviously conversion cannot be controlled except, of course, by unusually skillful evangelists.

But if one looks more closely it is obvious that there are more powerful administrative tools than evangelism to convert ethical standards into ethical conduct. It is true that the words of any code are only words, that it is people who act. But it is not necessary for all of the personnel of an agency, or even a majority of them, to be converted in order for a code to be an effective standard of conduct. What is required is action to effectuate it on the part of a number of persons in positions of authority, whether their authority be formal or informal. The code becomes for this authoritative group, if they are willing and able to use it, a more or less exact standard by which the conduct of agency members can be judged. It becomes a standard not for the review of specific acts, but for the judgment of the whole official performance of agency members. During the probationary period, persons who do not show a ready sense of the standards contained in the code may be dropped. When jobs which are the key to future opportunities become available, those who by the standards rank high may get them. When junior members are selected to share in discussions of pending policies, the ones who conform will be the ones invited to participate.

When more intimate associations develop within the range of junior-senior relationships, it will be those who meet the standards who get the friendly nod, the invitation to coffee, the invitation to walk home. Those who do not meet them will be excluded from the sphere of informal discussion and cut off from the opportunities to show their capacity for more demanding duty.

As this process develops the junior employees who find their own standards appropriately mirrored in the official code will evaluate their associates by these standards and those who fail to measure up will be excluded in many ways from the more intimate association of their colleagues. Men on the same level in an organization affect one another's future in many ways and those who are not generally accepted will fall behind those who form part of a congenial company of men with common standards. These are sanctions of no small effect, more continuously operative than the major sanctions which are attached to legal regulation.

Now it is true that such a process goes on in every working group. There is always some standard that develops out of shared activity. But there is a great deal of difference between the piecemeal elaboration of a working code in immediate response to the various demands of the working situation and a considered review of the implicit purposes which are being served. Presumably one kind of code will be some sort of reasonable variation from the other. Men's purposes are not only cherished in their minds; they are evident in their acts. But since they are at least partially knowing animals and since knowing is not an automatic process, the setting within which the view is taken will determine what is seen. And purposes in the heat of the event, partially apprehended, may not be the purposes which will be willingly affirmed when a span of events is covered. There is reason to think, therefore, that a deliberately-developed code will be somewhat different from one that is implicit in day-to-day activity.⁶

⁶ For a technical analysis of this matter see Muzafer Sherif, *The Psychology of Social Norms* (Harper & Bros., 1936), ch. 1. For the dynamic quality of group decision as opposed to exhortation in effecting a change in conduct see Kurt Lewin, "Forces behind Food Habits and

Once a code is enunciated it becomes common property in a way in which implicit codes are not. Everyone can know its provisions. It has the blessing of legitimacy. There is no need for individuals to doubt their own understanding of the situation. Here it is stated for all to see. It is easier to follow as it is accepted by the individual and easier to implement through sanctions of one kind or another. It is in this quality of sanctions that a code of ethics shows its primary difference from ethical standards individually held. The sanctions imposed by conscience, or if you will, the superego, are not subject to administrative control. But the sanctions that may be attached to a code of ethics, a standard initially, at least, external to the individual, are. Since the sanctions are for offenses too difficult of definition to be punishable as infractions of regulations, they must be both restricted and flexible—a matter for subtle judgment rather than formal rule. But sanctions they may be for all that.

The individual faced with an ethical code to which various sanctions are attached is therefore in a very different position from the individual faced with the pain of departure from his own personal standards. He may find the internal pain reduced through many departures from his original standards, or he may avoid it entirely by a redefinition of his standards. But the sanctions of a code are less escapable. A code may have definite consequences attached to it as a private standard may not. It presents more clearly differentiated alternatives by which a choice may be made. And it will not be surprising if, after a period of acting according to externally imposed consequences, the standard of action becomes an internal one as well—a habit of action which it takes considerable effort to displace.

It is obvious that there is nothing self-enforcing about an ethical code. It can be enforced only when a sufficient number of persons in appropriate positions accept it as a guide to their own action with respect to their fellows. But unlike personal conversion, it does not require that all of the members of a working group accept it. It does not even require a

majority. Rather, it must be accepted only by those who by their action are able to affect in significant ways the careers of their associates and subordinates. This fact also indicates a limitation—a code cannot set a higher standard than is apt to be followed by such a strategic group. In all probability it must be worked out with their cooperation. Furthermore, in the nature of things, the strategic group is likely to differ only in a limited degree from the others whose conduct it is desired to affect. They live largely in the same world, they reached their positions in comparable ways, they are responsive to about the same forces. However they are likely to differ somewhat, and if they do, an ethical code has some possible usefulness.

The other limitations of a code are obvious. A code of any kind is useful only to the degree that its principles can be applied to the normal range of business of the agency so as to give answers which will be approximately the same for all those who are attempting to find them. This suggests that for greatest usefulness a code should be formulated in relation to the business to which it applies. Its seeming generalities must have rather specific meaning to those who apply them. It must cover the kind of decisions they are making, the situations which for them contain conflicts between immediate expediency and long-run standards. A code promulgated by the legislature or by a specially appointed commission, for example, will be limited in effect. A code is more likely to be effective in agencies with established functions than in those which are exploring new kinds of activity. It will be most effective among people who expect to be working together for a long time and who see their future as depending on the judgment of their fellows.⁷

Yet, despite all of these limitations an ethical code would seem to be an important device for administrative control—useful in reducing to systematic statement the highest standards of perception and devotion which are active within an agency and securing their general adoption.

Methods of Change," in National Research Council, Committee on Food Habits, *Problem of Changing Food Habits* (The Council, 1943).

⁷ These limits on scope and effect are treated more fully in an article by the author, "A Code of Ethics for Public Administration," 21 *George Washington Law Review* 423-44 (March, 1953).

British New Town Development: Some Administrative Weaknesses

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THE building of New Towns in Britain came in the wake of the astonishing Labor party victory immediately after World War II. Adoption of the policy marked the culmination of many trends: the perennial dissatisfaction with the disorder, congestion, dirt, slums, and dangers of overcrowded cities; the urge to guide urban growth and to replace a negative drift with a daring constructive policy; the concern over the loss of good agricultural land to housing, commercial, and industrial development; the discontent with the dreary housing estates built before the war, housing unrelated to employment centers or community facilities; and the impatience with the single-minded Trading Estates policy that encouraged industries in "depressed" economic areas but slighted housing and community facilities, and also industrial development in other areas.

The now famous Barlow, Scott, and Uthwatt reports focused attention on these issues and some of the policy proposals. Wartime destruction and suffering heightened the popular interest. The Great London plans fired the debates and gave rise to high expectations; they also sparked the legislation by calling for seven to ten New Towns in the London region. Later housing and reconstruction crises helped to overwhelm the prestige of Churchill's wartime leadership; and New Towns, an idea sponsored by the dissident housers and planners of the country, provided a novel, attractive policy for the Labor party suddenly catapulted into control of the government.

But postwar economic difficulties, the weakened condition of the British economy, depleted resources, the "dollar gap," labor and

materials shortages, and the general austerity policy slowed the tempo. The New Towns Act and the Reith reports, which laid the foundations for the legislation, were prepared with great haste because of the prospects of prompt government backing.¹ With delay unavoidable, more thorough evaluation is appropriate. Limited though the present experience may be, it provides an inkling of obstacles and possible needed readjustments.

The New Towns Act

THE New Towns Act authorized Development Corporations to plan, build, and, for a certain period of time, manage the New Towns. The Reith Committee also recommended the use of local authorities and authorized associations for these purposes,² but these proposals failed to receive the Labor Government's support. The Development Corporations, managed by not more than nine directors, are responsible to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Secretary of State for Scotland.

Financing in the form of loans and grants is entirely the responsibility of the central gov-

¹ See *Interim Report*, *Second Interim Report*, and *Final Report of the New Towns [Reith] Committee*, Cmd. 6759, 6794, and 6876 (H.M. Stationery Office, 1946). This committee was appointed by the Ministry of Town and Country Planning to report on "the general questions of the establishment, development, organisation and administration that will arise in the promotion of New Towns in furtherance of a policy of planned decentralisation from congested urban areas; . . ." The Reith Committee was able to make such speedy and detailed recommendations partly because it leaned heavily on a prior technical report of an interdepartmental committee of civil servants.

² *Interim Report*, pp. 9-10.

ernment. Initiative for the formation of these towns may come from the local or the central authorities. Hearings to determine the need for such towns and any possible objections are mandatory. Site selection is the responsibility of the Ministry, though the Development Corporations exercise the compulsory purchase powers. Because of the effects of their decisions and plans on the local areas, development, close cooperation between the Development Corporation, the Statutory Undertakers, and the local and county authorities in the area is indispensable. But plans for the site, if approved by the Minister, do not require local approval. Development powers include construction of housing, factories, stores, and utilities. Water, sewerage, lighting, road, and other facilities may be provided if specific authorization is secured and if local authorities or Statutory Undertakers are unable or unwilling to provide the particular service.

The Ministry to which the Corporations are responsible was created in 1943. Established as the Ministry of Town and Country Planning,³ it later was assigned responsibility for housing and local government and became the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. The Ministry is the over-all organization coordinating the Central Land Board, the New Towns Development Corporations, and the National Parks Commission. Interdepartmental and regional committees are used to integrate policies of the several Ministries concerned with transportation, industrial location, agricultural land use, and public works—functions that lie outside the jurisdiction of the junior Ministry.⁴

The original Ministry of Town and Country Planning was not very large. It had a total staff of 1,220 persons. Almost one-third were professional or specialized personnel. The research staff had 69 persons trained primarily in geography, geology, and town planning. Most of the "research" work consists of surveys and

fact gathering for administrative policy decisions.

A Development Corporation generally has a small professional staff that usually includes an architect-planner, an engineer, a clerk, and a manager as the key administrative officials. This staff serves the part-time, unsalaried corporation directors, at least one of whom must live in or have special knowledge of the area. The others are presumably men of wide experience representing many points of view.

This, in brief, is the machinery devised to build New Towns. It has functioned as a "going concern." Development Corporations exist. Construction has commenced on fourteen towns. Although the Conservative Government has decided to start no new ones, the policy of New Towns has been described as one of the key weapons of the planner, and it may well be. It is therefore important to examine critical weaknesses which, if not corrected, may vitiate the New Towns program.

New Towns and Organization for National Planning

Jobs, homes, services, and utilities are necessary ingredients for a New Town that is not primarily a dormitory, a workshop, or a recreation or other specialized area. Development Corporations cannot build such "complete" towns by themselves: they lack the staff, the organization, the experience, and the financial resources or subsidies. To a much larger extent than is often realized, their task is to enlist the help of other organizations, private or public, that can provide these types of assistance. They must also have the cooperation of other agencies of government to bring jobs, families, and necessary services to the sites of the New Towns.

It is clear that Development Corporations ought to be closely associated with the strategic Ministries and other government agencies whose decisions directly and vitally affect physical development. They include, among others, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. There is at present no central planning agency with power to require the various national agencies to adapt their policies and programs to a national planning and develop-

³ This Ministry grew originally out of the reconstruction section of the Ministry of Works and Planning; its title later was changed to Ministry of Local Government and Planning, and when the Conservative party regained power, to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government.

⁴ For a more detailed description see R. Vance Pres-
thuis, "A Note on British Town Planning Coordination,"
14 *Journal of Politics* 471-87 (1952).

ment policy. Such coordination as is achieved comes through informal Cabinet decisions and policies adopted by interdepartmental committees.

There would have been some advantages in locating the Development Corporations in the Board of Trade rather than in the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. A senior Ministry, it has power over licensing of new plants and other industrial location controls under the 1950 and 1947 legislation dealing with industry and town planning.⁵ It is also responsible for encouraging industrial development in depressed areas. There are also some advantages in the present location of the Corporations. Housing constitutes most of the physical built-up area of a town. Housing costs and problems in New Towns are serious and will receive sympathetic consideration from the Minister of Housing and Local Government. So, too, will questions involving local government and boundaries.

The present organization also creates certain difficulties for the Corporations. One or two examples will illustrate some of the handicaps under which they operate.⁶ Final decisions on location of sites for New Towns are made by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. Such decisions should be based on economics as well as other factors, but there are scarcely any trained economists in the Ministry. At least *pro forma* the Board of Trade is closely associated with the program and committed to its implementation. In fact, the Board to date has had neither the staff nor the time to do the careful research or analysis necessary to check decisions on site location.

L. E. White and other New Town proponents have charged that the policy of the Board has not been helpful to the New Towns or conducive to the policy of dispersal.⁷ This accusation may be true, but it is less a reflection

of hostile attitudes than of inconsistent policy commitments. The Board must use its licensing power over steel and plant construction to help export activities, to expedite defense construction, and to strengthen the Development and Unemployment Areas.⁸ New Towns are at the end of the queue.

Equally problematic is the question of creating a diversified economic base for New Towns. There is not much likelihood that such a base will be achieved without power to control or induce the right activities, and without the cooperation of the agency most able to contribute to the program. At present town planners can do scarcely more than guess blindly about the new economic activities they hope will come to a town. Coordinated development, where it has occurred, cannot be attributed to planning: it is largely coincidence!

Regional Development

THE Ministry's decisions on New Towns also appear to be dangerously *ad hoc*. Ebenezer Howard once remarked that when he conceived the idea of Garden Cities practically no one had any "conception whatever of regional planning. A colossal mistake might be made," he declared, "if in starting new towns, the importance of their interrelationships has not been sufficiently recognized."⁹ This view was expressed a quarter of a century after he had written *Garden Cities of To-morrow*. Howard did not pursue this analysis very far, and his followers, too, have generally overlooked or failed to explore this question. However understandable the reasons for this failure, regional considerations cannot be long neglected without some serious errors being made.

Once a policy of building New Towns is adopted, some basic questions ought to be asked. What are the functions of the various regions and cities? How should a rational plan of national development proceed? What are the highest social priorities for building New Towns? In Britain much more thought should

⁵ The 1950 Distribution of Industries Bill requires licenses for factories over 10,000 square feet; and the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 requires licenses for factories of 5,000 square feet or more.

⁶ These examples have been selected to illustrate the problems affecting industrial location. But parallel problems can be cited for decisions on the use of agricultural land, transport development, and the like.

⁷ L. E. White, *New Towns: Their Challenge and Opportunity* (London: The National Council of Social Service, 1951), p. 87.

⁸ Unemployment areas are smaller localized areas of unemployment. Development areas may include part or the whole of a metropolis or region.

⁹ "Planning Problems of Towns, City and Region," in *Papers and Discussions at the International City and Regional Planning Conference, N.Y.C.* (Baltimore: Norman Remington Co., 1925), p. 8.

be given to how the present economic problems and the need for encouraging exports affect the decision to build New Towns, the location of these towns, and their functions and pace of development. How should the various claims for land, particularly those for agriculture, be reconciled with the New Towns and low density policy? How should these various problems be attacked? These questions have not been painstakingly examined, and one curious consequence may be that amorphous suburbs will be replaced by amorphous New Town developments.

To say that the central government must decide many of these issues does not imply dictation by the central government or the absence of local initiative. For the government would have this obligation even if it did not have to act until the local authority requested assistance or until conflicting claims emerged. If orderly regional and national development is to be encouraged, adequate criteria and policies must be set. For example, under the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 the counties and county boroughs are preparing development plans for the next twenty years. The Ministry of Housing and Local Government must review these plans, analyze their regional and national implications, and check them for consistency, but it is not in a good position to conduct this review while the data are skimpy, the techniques of analysis primitive, and the Ministry's technical staff largely unprepared for such responsibilities.

The Ministry to date seems to be relying on a planners' version of "the unseen hand" to achieve its objective. In its review, *Town and Country Planning 1943-51*, it asks:

... Will plans of this kind dovetail into a sensible pattern of land use for the whole of England and Wales? ...

... What has been done to ensure that the development plans of 62 counties and 83 county boroughs make up a pattern rather than a patchwork quilt and that the joins are not too obvious?

The regional projects of Government departments, nationalised industries and public authorities ... are being notified to planning authorities as they prepare their plans. But the greater part of the work of dovetailing and reconciling plans must be left to the local planning Authorities themselves, either through the formal machinery of joint advisory committees or by other means, and

with such help as the Ministry can give them through its Regional Controllers. The work involves a great deal of consultation with neighbouring authorities, with statutory undertakers, with representatives of industry and with all kinds of bodies having regional as well as local interests. It is hoped that, by the time plans are submitted for the Minister's approval, the national and regional aspects will have received their due attention and that the adjoining plans will agree.¹⁰

Perversely enough, there is disturbing evidence that the regional problems are being ignored. Robert B. Black, after reviewing the problems and experience of the Northeast region, concluded that, "at present there is no Regional machinery whatever, and little Regional Planning."¹¹ The London Planning Administration Committee declared unanimously that "... if the overall Plan is to be carried through, some kind of (local) regional authority must be set up. ..."¹² And R. Vance Presthus in "A Note on British Town Planning Coordination" observed:

... the two principal [regional] co-ordinating committees [of the central government] ... are not very effective ... and such co-ordination as occurs is the result of *ad hoc* consultation between senior civil servants and the more powerful local planning authorities. In the latter case, however, the conflict of interest between great cities, such as Manchester and Liverpool, and their respective county planning authority throws the burden of co-ordination in many cases on central government.

In sum, despite the great strides which have obviously been taken, it seems fair to conclude that effective town planning will await an extensive overhaul of the national and regional machinery which presently seeks to co-ordinate Whitehall and the local planner.¹³

¹⁰ *Progress Report by the Minister of Local Government and Planning on the Work of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning*, Cmd. 8204 (H.M. Stationery Office, 1951), pp. 25-26.

¹¹ R. B. Black, "Town and Country Planning in England's Northeast Section," 15 *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 31 (1949).

¹² Ministry of Town and Country Planning, *Report of the London Administration Committee* (H.M. Stationery Office, 1949), p. 10. There is a fairly large literature on the problems of regional organization. For an excellent brief review, see Peter Self, *Regionalism: A Report on Local Government* (London: Fabian Publications and Allen and Unwin, 1949), 96 pp.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 486-87.

Moreover, major economic analyses are outside the purview of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. The Board of Trade deals with economic activities generally, with industrial location, with permits for new plant construction and location, and with Trading Estates and Development Areas. At present it would be the most logical central agency to evaluate the economic structure and potentials of each region and the relevant aspects of the Development Plan, but it lacks sufficient powers and many of its personnel are skeptical about their capacity to handle this assignment—aside from any lingering ideological distaste for planning. Moreover, the legislation controlling the Board places considerable emphasis on special and temporary policies not necessarily compatible with long-range regional or New Town development.

In short, the tasks of securing adequate liaison and comprehensive regional plans have yet to be solved.

Linkages with Existing Towns

MOST of the New Towns envisioned by the Reith Committee were intended to promote a decongestion policy for London, or at least to provide a more coherent metropolitan growth. This recognition of the functions New Towns can perform for an existing city was an important advance, but the means devised to implement it leave much to be desired. Difficulties are already in evidence in the initial stages of New Town growth that bid fair to become even more serious if the program is carried forward.

Development Corporations started from scratch. They were new, independent agencies. They had to develop their plans, their building organization, their labor force, and their other personnel. Probably no effective building record could have been anticipated during the first two or three years. In the meantime, existing local authorities, possessed of experience, organization, and political prestige and harried by housing shortages, proceeded to build and to build quickly. As a result, a large—perhaps an overwhelming—portion of new housing has been and is still being built by the local authorities and the ordinary builders.

In view of these obvious factors in the situation, it is surprising that the Labor Minister

ignored the wise recommendations of the Reith Committee to permit local authorities, if not authorized associations, to aid in the building of New Towns. Although only a few larger local authorities were directly affected by the New Towns development and possessed the necessary resources, leadership, and initiative to aid it, there would seem to be no good reason for excluding those that wanted to participate in it from doing so.¹⁴

Building might be more of a planned operation, rather than frantic guesswork, if there were a definite relationship between the internal reconstruction program of one or more local authorities and the New Town Development Corporation. Under any circumstances it would be difficult to predict the characteristics of the potential families, their income, and their requirements. To date, however, the need to attract industries, the need to house construction workers and key employees of migrating industries, and the desire to secure a variety of skills and income groups in New Towns have tended to make housing available for groups other than those with high housing priorities or displaced by urban reconstruction programs. Such needs have impelled the Development Corporations to get on with the job of building their towns and to be concerned with successful building performance rather than the collateral benefits the New Towns might confer on existing communities.

Suppose, however, that these problems are solved and the New Towns are built. It seems likely that the country will then be faced with the accentuation of a problem with which it has wrestled for the past half century, namely, many small jurisdictions within a single metropolitan region. One of the important tasks today, particularly in the London region, is the development of a suitable organization to handle regional problems.¹⁵ The purpose is not to absorb local governments but to set up some workable arrangement for the handling of regional problems and services. The present

¹⁴ There were no legal impediments to prevent the Minister from allowing approved authorities to participate.

¹⁵ Ministry of Town and Country Planning, *Report of the London Planning Administration Committee* (H.M. Stationery Office, 1949). This committee was unanimous on the need for regional organization.

program works in the opposite direction. A high official has already characterized New Towns Corporations as "cuckolds" in the nests of local authorities. They will create new independent communities precisely when an example of federation is most justified. For when the Corporations, in the judgment of the Minister, have largely completed the task of development, the New Towns will be turned over to the local authorities of the areas in which they are located.¹⁶ Provision for the participation of local authorities in the development of the towns might have helped to forestall some difficulties, but the Minister preferred the creation of independent, self-governing towns.

The financial problems that seem likely to arise also underscore the importance of participation by local authorities. Most authorities are reluctant to export any important source of potential income; they have fixed financial commitments that induce them to try to avoid the loss of any possible revenues. If the New Towns were not entirely outside the corporate jurisdiction of the local authorities, the redistribution of economic activities might be more easily encouraged. Some financial dilemmas of New Towns would also be avoided if they had the status and resources of local authorities—utilities would be more easily financed, rent restrictions avoided, and the forbidding costs of new construction significantly cut by a more flexible use of local rates and existing housing subsidies.

Under present circumstances, the building of New Towns does not seem likely to result in effective decentralization. When relocation occurs, existing houses and plants are rarely demolished. A tight materials and housing situation and high costs preclude such action,¹⁷

and new families and new economic activities therefore replace those that leave. With such a big and obvious loophole, the total population of the region is expected to increase. At present the top officials confess sadly that they are helpless and simply have no way of coping with this dilemma.

One of the exacting jobs for the future is to bridge the gap between existing city and New Town. The interdependence of new and old towns must be understood and exploited. Otherwise, if unsuccessful, the program will be a trivial episode in planning involving the building of a few New Towns; or, if successful, these towns will be a potential economic menace to important existing communities and a breeding ground for jurisdictional conflicts.

Research

ALMOST every aspect of the New Towns program could profit from research. It is astonishing, therefore, that the able report of the Reith Committee made no recommendation on this subject. If the explanation stems in any part from the belief that the answers to the problems of these towns are known, it reflects a thoroughly uncritical awareness of what they are.

The Ministry of Housing and Local Government made a brief foray into socio-economic research in 1948 in a program that dealt with the size and growth of towns, population, households, and dwellings; employment and industrial structure; and the neighborhood pattern. Coordination with the New Towns was handled by a monthly conference of social development officers. Apparently the results were not impressive, at least to the principal officials. Inadequate data, lack of previous research, and the uncertainties of policies relating to New Towns and their rates of development handicapped the research. Scarcity of qualified personnel, personality difficulties, and the time-consuming character of such inquiries may also have contributed to the failure. Whatever the reasons may have been, the program was discontinued.

The present research staff is largely assigned to day-to-day fact-gathering activities. A few

¹⁶ These authorities will most probably be the Urban District Councils. But if a Council is large enough, it can proceed in the ordinary way to become a Municipal Borough. The New Towns Corporations, of course, have no governmental powers. They are public development agencies. For a discussion of the present plans for the windup of the Corporations, see *Hansard—House of Commons Debates*, May 7, 1946. Vol. 422, no. 134, col. 1083; July 4, 1946. Vol. 424, no. 169, cols. 2379-2401.

¹⁷ The London County Council gets only a 20 per cent grant to cover costs of acquisition of central area commercial land; and 50 per cent in the case of blitzed areas.

According to the authorities involved, the cost of acquisition is still definitely prohibitive.

outside social studies have been sponsored: an investigation by the Social Survey on the people who would go to New Towns; an inquiry on the use of the shopping facilities in Bourneville by the Village Trust; special overlay maps with socio-economic data; and the like. There have also been considerable explorations of planning standards and of the geology of New Towns areas and air photographs have been made, but even these limited efforts have been somewhat curtailed. The Ministry contends that research contributing to thought and to knowledge about town planning

... is primarily the responsibility of universities and non-governmental bodies, although the planning authorities must be concerned with the collection and analysis of information, and also with the observation of current practice and experience. For the Ministry and for local planning authorities, concerned as they must be to keep their staff demands to a minimum, the question must always be whether any particular study makes a direct and demonstrably useful contribution to their planning administration. Judged from this point of view, the true "research" in which either party should engage must be small, though accurate knowledge of the physical conditions of areas to be planned is always necessary.¹⁸

Unfortunately there is little basic research in town planning now under way at the universities or in nongovernmental bodies.¹⁹ Since the Ministry is aware of this situation, and since it is not pressing or stimulating the universities to perform this function, it is distressingly obvious that a dangerous gap exists.

When an investment involving several million pounds is to be made, it would seem to be penny wise and pound foolish to scrimp on a research program costing a few thousand pounds that might ensure more economical and wiser decisions. Most large-scale business organizations that are efficient make a practice of setting aside a sum of money for research on product improvement. When the government engages in what is essentially a public entre-

preneurial activity, it might do well to emulate this common-sense business policy.

Techniques for analyzing income distribution, population trends, and family characteristics in the regions of potential New Town development need refinement. Present data are crude and often unreliable. Criteria governing the priorities for New Town development also require review. Decision-makers need guidance on the functions of existing cities, their interdependence, the economic functions of New Towns, and how they might or should fit into the existing urban patterns. Policy-makers are not at all sure what is an optimum-size city or whether there are several optimum sizes for cities. If various kinds of communities are to be developed, how can this program be made to work? Is there any experience on this problem? And what alternatives should be explored? Many persons, too, are beginning to ponder the limitations of the neighborhood concept and the extent to which planners should take into account arguments and evidence of dissenting students on this subject.

Only issues which might shape important planning decisions have been noted. Obviously the list can be extended in other directions. Doubtless there are other technical, social, and economic questions, and some may be even more pressing than those that have been mentioned.²⁰ What is almost beyond dispute, however, is that the New Towns program is embarking on an extremely novel and ambitious operation involving great risks and great possibilities of achievement. Only the crudest outlines of the goal are known. Planners face to face with these responsibilities would be presumptuous to rely on pat solutions or the existing fragmentary rules of thumb.

The experience on which to base analysis does not exist on many points, but that is not an argument against a research program. An experimental approach to town building can and should be maintained. On occasion, alter-

¹⁸ *Town and Country Planning 1943-1951* . . . *op. cit.*, pp. 165-66.

¹⁹ Cf. Lloyd Rodwin, "The Achilles Heel of British Town Planning," 24 *Town Planning Review* (April, 1953); and Michael Patrick Fogarty, *Town and Country Planning* (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1948), pp. 194-200.

²⁰ Thus Dr. Bronowski has shown how operational building research, under the Ministry of Works and later the Building Research Stations, was of direct practical assistance in raising productivity. But this promising program, alas, has been discontinued. For an excellent analysis of its potential contributions see J. Bronowski, "Operational and Statistical Research in Building," 113 *Architects' Journal* 403-6 (March 29, 1951).

native solutions can be deliberately developed for test purposes. As Professor R. K. Merton has pointed out:

... In the world laboratory of the sociologist, as in the more secluded laboratories of the physicist and chemist, it is the successful experiment which is decisive and not the thousand-and-one failures which preceded it. More is learned from the single success than from the multiple failures. A single success proves it can be done. Thereafter, it is necessary only to learn what made it work.²¹

Too often new experimental achievements do not become part of our heritage because the nature of the success has gone unrecorded.

Summary Observations

THE idea of building New Towns is deceptively simple. It has the allure of the virgin site, of new administrative machinery, and of public financing. But the public entrepreneurs must also reckon with existing agencies and policies, and with existing cities, habits, and trends.

Experience so far has turned up some difficulties that are sobering. The most obvious are the limited powers of the Development Corporations and of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. To establish a relatively "balanced" community presupposes power over many forces, including industrial location and general economic development. Both are outside the power of the Ministry or of the Development Corporations. Other national objectives, such as the promotion of Development Areas, the encouragement of export trade, or even the expansion of agriculture, may have features that are inconsistent with the policy of establishing New Towns; and the existing machinery is not geared to anticipate or resolve such conflicts.

Regional considerations have also been slighted. To get the program under way, and

to avoid the problems of slow, unwieldy development, New Towns are being built without any long-range analysis of where they should be built, what their functions should be, and what priorities should govern the growth of different regions.

Links with existing cities are also inadequate. The New Towns are primarily intended to serve the existing cities; but the administrative organization, the emphasis on New Towns, the need to build quickly, the failure to permit local-authority participation in the process of building, and the absence of control over the replacement of population and economic activities siphoned from the central areas make the attainment of this objective improbable.

And the absence of any significant research program, other than surveys and fact gathering for short-range administrative purposes, suggests that there is not sufficient awareness of the gaps in understanding and of the costly and avoidable blunders that may be made.

One of Ebenezer Howard's ideals, which has proved appealing to a whole generation of planners, is the "balanced" city. It is one of those notions, like virtue, which all embrace, though few fully comprehend. Still it has been a suggestive concept and has prompted fruitful questions. Close scrutiny leads one to wonder whether Howard's views and the contemporary New Towns' policy may possibly suffer from "imbalance." The approach does not seem to be sufficiently comprehensive. The interest has been largely in the new community. The balance sought is largely between place of work and residence and town and country. Not enough emphasis has been placed on the varying functions and size of cities; on the interrelationships of existing and new cities; and on an evaluation of development prospects and requirements from a regional point of view. Exploring this wider, more "balanced" view would appear to be one of the major tasks of the present generation of planners.

²¹ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1949), p. 195.

Reviews of Books and Documents

Foreign Policy and the Dispersion of Power

By Harold Stein, Public Administration Clearing House

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, by Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Jr. Harvard University Press, 1952. Pp. 244. \$3.75.

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY; ITS ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL: Report of a Study Group for the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, by William Yandell Elliott. Columbia University Press, 1952. Pp. 288. \$3.75.

TWO weeks before the writing of this review, Clement Attlee, Leader of H. M. Loyal Opposition, made a speech in the House of Commons in which, by way of preamble and explanation, he dealt at some length with the United States Constitution—not merely (and not very accurately) with the Constitution as written, but largely (and accurately) with the unwritten Constitution that governs and fails to govern our governmental actions. And the difficulties of which he spoke will not disappear. "One of the disadvantages," he said, "of the American system of democracy is that it is sometimes hard to find where effective power lies." Most of the complaints about Mr. Attlee's words have been wide of the mark; on this, his central theme, he can properly be convicted of gross British understatement.

In diverse ways, these two books struggle with this same central theme. One, the Study Group Report, ranges far and wide, but never loses sight of this as the crucial problem for students of our government; the other, the work of Professors Cheever and Haviland, deals with one specialized aspect of it—the separation of powers, as it is called, between the Congress and the Executive. But the constitutional definition of the spheres of the two branches in foreign policy, as it has developed over the past century and half, is so intimately related to, is so much a cause of the general dis-

persion of power in our government that the range of the two books is remarkably similar.

I

CHEEVER and Haviland treat their subject historically; rather more than half of the volume is an account of executive-congressional relations, partly in terms of epochs, e.g. "Presidential Initiative, 1789-1929," partly in terms of episodes, e.g. "The Marshall Plan." The combination of historical summaries and detailed case studies is a happy one. The reader has some opportunity to experience the rather different advantages of perspective in time and immersion in recent realities. By selecting events of the recent past as the subjects for case study treatment, the authors give the reader a sense of vicarious experience that is related to government today, or something close to government today.

The total effect of this historical review is surprisingly dramatic, all the more so because it treads such familiar ground. There is nothing very new about Federalist and Jeffersonian energy and leadership; John Hay's lamentations are a twice-told tale; there have been reasonably adequate accounts of Mr. Hull's cautious maneuverings, and of the successful though painful birth of the Marshall Plan and NATO; and the history of the Wilsonian tragedy haunts us all. What is new is the convenient juxtaposition of these successive developments without *parti pris* and in sequence.

The conclusion, irresistible to this reviewer, is a striking one. Never in the history of the Republic has foreign policy been so dependent on congressional action as it was during the administration of President Truman; and no President has had more success in securing favorable congressional action than Mr. Truman in spite of constant attack on him in Congress,

in the newspapers, and among the public, and even though his chief lieutenant, the Secretary of State, was being vilified as none of his predecessors had been for a hundred years or more. And more surprising still, for two of the seven and one-half years, the opposition party controlled Congress, and at two different periods was confidently expected to be on the point of winning the Presidency.

This categorical assertion that Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson were brilliantly successful in securing favorable and positive congressional action will probably find general acceptance with respect to our activities in the Atlantic world; but how can it be reconciled with the contemptuous assault on the administration's policy for China and the Far East generally? Quite simply, as Cheever and Haviland point out, the administration had no policy to avert the Chinese catastrophe; it had no requests to make of Congress, for it had no plan of definitive, immediate action. In Korea, when it proposed and took dramatic action in June, 1950, it found full congressional support; but after the retrograde maneuver from the Yalu, after the stabilization of the lines, the policy of limited action, then reaffirmed, found almost no supporters, or no audible ones—though the funds for the troops and supplies have not been withheld.

The contrast between the disputes over the Far East and the acceptance by Congress of the tremendous aid programs in Europe—economic and military—and of the agreements and unprecedented alliances, all requiring senatorial assent or legislation by both Houses, again and again, and enormous appropriations to boot, is inescapable. A contrast of night and day; yet the circumstances, as the authors point out, were also critically different. The European programs represented positive, hopeful, action; the program for China, and for Korea in 1951, represented acceptance of grave loss in one case, and limited action with no clear end in sight in the other.

The distinction is worth pondering. Whatever the defects of our Far Eastern policy—and that there were defects at least of detail is hardly arguable—it is abundantly clear that neither of the parties, nor any partisan faction, nor any bipartisan group had at any time a coherent policy of its own that could command

congressional support: voting money for the Chinese Nationalist government was not a program; and support of General MacArthur, enthusiastic as it was, led to the creation of no alternative program for Korea. The occasional quasi-positive moves were sporadic and largely symbolic: the Congress once again showed that where it takes the initiative in foreign relations its actions are, perhaps must be, essentially negative. The same conclusion holds for less dramatic issues, too. Congressional activity in immigration legislation, over President Truman's opposition, was restrictive and negative, and, to the extent that Congress took the lead in tariff policy, its determinants were narrowly domestic in origin and largely heedless of the world outside our boundaries.

This is hardly a surprising conclusion. Congressmen are not elected by the citizens of Pakistan or Uruguay, and the silver of Nevada weighs more in the political scales than maintenance of the Indian economy. Cheever and Haviland have noted all this and defined it with care and precision. They fail, however, to comment on the further question: what price intelligent, patient inaction and restraint in a world that will not always conform to the myth that Brogan has called "the illusion of American omnipotence"? Could, for example, our admirable handling of the Yugoslav situation since the war have been possible if Yugoslavia had possessed the practical importance and symbolic weight of China in the minds of public and Congress? Our governmental capacity to act courageously and continuously in foreign affairs represents a revolutionary improvement of the past dozen years, perhaps permanent, perhaps not; but our ability to endure adversity with patience and courage, to wait for and exploit the breaks, is yet to be acquired.

The emergence of the United States as the leader of the free nations is one of the critically important developments of this century. Our willingness to assume a role that we refused thirty years ago is a striking phenomenon, and it has required cooperation between President and Congress within our constitutional framework. In the fullest sense, it has been a developmental process. The acquisition of a dozen bases and gift of fifty destroyers that President Roosevelt moved on so cautiously

less than fifteen years ago would be a routine, indeed a minor transaction today. A peacetime long-term military alliance like NATO would have seemed inconceivable to a President who used and needed all the gifts of a great politician and public hero to secure the repeal of the arms embargo.

We have traveled a long road, but the administrative meaning of this development should not be misunderstood. It does not represent an enlargement of executive powers; it represents a governmental acceptance, by both branches, of new national responsibilities. This distinction has not been sufficiently noted. It has been generally assumed, as by the authors of both books under review, that the President's area of discretion has been enlarged—but a comparison of the President's almost unfettered freedom under the Lend-Lease Act with the elaborate restrictions of the recent aid acts (including organizational precepts and limitations) is enough to demonstrate the point, and the encroachments on executive discretion in the recent extensions of the Trade Agreements Act may serve as additional evidence if more is needed. In sum, then, Congress has moved forward, under presidential leadership; and the Presidents have moved forward too. There has been no constitutional shift; there has been successful use of the constitutional means that lie open to courageous Presidents and to Congresses with a core of responsible leadership.

Cheever and Haviland examine these means. They note, for example, the success of Secretary Hull's Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy in which representatives of both branches and of the public came to a formally uncommitted but effective meeting of the minds; and they cite the other techniques of cooperation—the appointment of congressional delegates on missions, the patient cultivation of good will at dinners, the laborious presentation of testimony, and all the rest. On the congressional side they point to the educational work of select committees like the Herter Committee and the Colmer Committee (committees whose creation would have been inhibited by the legislative reforms of 1946). And quite rightly they speak of the crucial role of Senator Vandenberg.

Senator Vandenberg's great services to his

country were based on his almost unerring sense of the appropriate relations between executive and legislative branches and of the effective function of Congress generally, and the Senate in particular, in foreign policy. His course of action was founded on the premise that leadership must come from the President. Thus in 1947, during the 80th Congress, he "insisted that the chief executive must take the initiative and responsibility for a special session of Congress. 'The information is all down there [in the White House and State Department], the President must make an authenticated disclosure of the Administration's plans.'" But equally, he knew that he himself, the Congress, and the Republican party—especially in a Republican Congress—must share in the glory; hence many of the minor changes in the Economic Cooperation Act, hence the appointment of Mr. Hoffman as its first administrator, hence the Vandenberg Resolution rather than a presidential message as harbinger of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Senator Vandenberg's success (and the success of Senator Barkley and others whose virtues were obscured by the comparative predictability of Democratic support) was predicated on his understanding of the power structure within which he operated. He knew how to work with Democratic Senators, and how to persuade Republicans to follow him. He knew what he could ask from the administration. His part in drafting legislation was not merely passive, but he never assumed that it was his function, or the function of his party, or of Congress to create a rival foreign policy of its own. Perhaps bipartisanship can attain its full effect only when handled by men like Secretary Hull and Senator Vandenberg who love and have an instinctive feeling for the process of congressional politics.

During most of the past decade we have had effective leadership in the White House, in both parties in the Senate, and in the House of Representatives. But this leadership has been able to rely on a base of public information and public understanding. Cheever and Haviland point out some of the ways in which these have developed—the action of elite groups like the William Allen White Committee, and the Stimson-Patterson Committee for the Marshall Plan. (Oddly enough, they make no mention

of the universities; but does not the late Charles A. Beard bear some of the responsibility for crystallizing the latent isolationism of the American people?) And they point out the tremendous impact of world events.

And malt does more than Milton can
To justify God's ways to man.

The partition of Poland was tangible beer compared to the *Paradise Lost* of the Quarantine speech. Thus, for the Marshall Plan, the works of the Stimson-Patterson Citizens Committee and other volunteer groups were useful, but Stalin's decision to destroy Czechoslovakian freedom carried more weight with the Congress. This fact the authors point out; but again they fail to ask the question of why this spurred us to action and involvement, not to withdrawal and isolation. Why ECA and NATO rather than a Neutrality Act? And here we come full cycle. Over the years education had been proceeding apace, with the lead taken by the one man whose position gives him a nationwide schoolroom—the President of the United States. Perhaps the ultimate justification for President Roosevelt's caution, his hesitations, his occasional deviousness, is to be found in the way he gradually gained for the citizens of this democracy an understanding of the world in which we live—gained it for them, perchance, by gaining it for himself.

II

THE nature of this world is a central theme of the Report of the Study Group. *A*, not *the*, central theme, for this is an oddly constructed work with no single theme. The members of the Study Group met regularly over the course of a year. They are an interestingly diversified group: three political scientists (all with government experience)—William Y. Elliott, McGeorge Bundy, and Don K. Price; an economist turned college president, Harry D. Gideonse; an historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.; and a foreign service officer on leave, George F. Kennan. The book is intended to be a composite of agreed views after discussion; one of the minor pleasures it affords the reader who knows the authors or their work is the opportunity for attempting to attribute various themes to the various participants. The scent is obscured in two ways. Compromise is

reflected more than once by baffling ambiguity; more important, Professor Elliott served as chief draftsman, and, as might be expected, his irrepressibly buoyant convictions flavor the whole. The result is far livelier than would have been the work of a mere taker of minutes, but the consequent confusion is notable. The personal comments of the individual members of the group in indicating "different emphases," i.e., dissent, suggest the force of the Elliottian impact as does the sharply contrasting impression given by Mr. Price's admirable lecture, "The New Dimension of Diplomacy," delivered for the Woodrow Wilson Foundation in connection with this inquiry and published separately in 1951.

The confusion, the divergent attitudes make for distraction. Certain hares (live or mechanical) keep running across the path: "All this is added to the natural drift toward Caesarism in complex and highly organized societies," and Caesar's ghost, "this monstrous apparition," bobs up again at least seven other times, though on one occasion in the less terrifying aspect of "the bugaboo of Executive Caesarism." The prophecy is always left dark, and appears even darker in the context of an underlying faith in the solidarity of our republican institutions, despite their manifold imperfections.

Dark allusions are indeed part of the pattern. There are several references to the democracies' need for overwhelming power, but neither concession nor denial that this is a rejection of the publicly proclaimed defensive strategy of NATO. And again there is the flat statement that "in order to survive, democracies must expand," the logical inference from which might well be that the Soviet myth of encirclement is true, not false as most of us consider it. Or again, one finds in a passing reference the phrase, "without terrorizing mere independence of mind," with its strong implication that independence of mind is at best a venial sin. Or similarly, "of course, the avenues of criticism must be left open to all but controlled enemy agents"; if the reference is applicable to peacetime, does this mean an abandonment of the policy of the Foreign Agents Registration Act—registration, disclosure, and free speech? Even more striking than any of these is the impassioned argument for

the thesis that war is inevitable, an argument presented only as an alternative, but far overshadowing the defense of the opposite thesis—the possibility of peace.

These are dark allusions and they run counter to the general thrust of the argument. Other *ex cathedra* statements also appear, but happily they lack the apocalyptic flavor and they appear to run with the argument. They deal with one of the chief preoccupations of the group, a public preoccupation of its chief draftsman for many years, constitutional reform. A whole series of constitutional amendments are proposed: as agreed by the group, as agreed in principle, as not agreed, but proposed none the less.

It is comforting to see scholars not overawed by the ponderous majesty of our amendatory process. If our governmental difficulties require constitutional solutions, let us make the attempt. But it would be more comforting if as much attention had been paid to the consequences of each proposal as to the ills it is designed to cure. Thus to cure deadlocks between President and Congress, it is proposed to permit the President to call for a special election, presumably of the House of Representatives, once in each presidential term. Yet no mention is made of the fact that the President almost invariably loses ground in elections except when he runs himself; of the further fact that the bulk of the seats in the House are held by men whose election is virtually unaffected by foreign policy issues; that in our federalistic, localistic country, with its highly independent state parties, the President cannot ensure the nomination of his supporters by his own party, and cannot defeat his enemies. One would hope that the lesson of Wilson's intervention in 1918, and Roosevelt's purge in 1938, would at least be mentioned; they may not be determinative of this issue, but surely they are relevant.

Throughout the recurring discussions of all the proposals for constitutional amendments there is indeed a pervasive air of academic unreality—quite unlike the thoroughly realistic (though not infrequently tendentious) analysis of the current and recent workings of our executive and legislative branches. What use a plea for treaty approval by straight constitutional majorities in both houses, when today's

living issue is the Bricker amendment?

The same unreality reappears in the discussion of our parties. Not a word in the text would suggest that the creation of "responsible parties" requires some adaptation to the deeply entrenched federalism of our party structure—far more potent than the federalism of our government. And the support given to the principle of the Lodge-Gossett amendment is based not, as one might expect, on the hope that it would encourage minority party activity in the one-party states but because "decreasing the power of minority blocks in the large states would certainly be eminently desirable," since our government suffers from over-representation of such minorities. This is an interesting *fiat*; ask our ambassador to India if our relations with that key country have suffered because our Negro minority has too much power in determining national policy! Congress, by constitutional provision, by accidents of sectional history, by malapportionment within the states, by its own customary procedures, is overweighted in favor of sectional and local interests, of the rural areas, of conservatism, of an endemic xenophobia; to keep the balance the President must have an alliance in which our urban majority, with its large minority groups, speaks loud and clear. Of course we have suffered from irritations and embarrassments in the conduct of our foreign policy created by these national minorities—all of them, at one time or another—but in practical effect we have suffered far more over the years from high-tariff pressure groups, urban and rural; from those who put lower taxes ahead of the building of alliances and the maintenance of our own armed forces; from Know-Nothingism; and from narrow prejudice.

The Study Group is on far firmer ground, as has been suggested, in its description of the dispersion of power in executive and legislature, with firm analysis of such topics as the irresponsibility of the standing committees of Congress and the fragmentation of the President's powers by statutory prescriptions for interdepartmental committees. But the approach to legislative reform, after this bold start, is surprisingly pallid; the daring is reserved for constitutional amendments, and the

proposals for changes short of amendment are little more than an exercise in homiletics. Congress is still *terra incognita*, and no one else has succeeded where these authors have failed. On the executive side, where the analysis is also perceptive and acute, the remedies proposed are concrete and practical. It is unnecessary to recount them here because in substance they have already been embodied in President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plans for the Departments of State and Defense.

It is not often that a Study Group finds its recommendations so promptly adopted by our Chief Magistrate. This is success beyond peradventure; but the value of the work is not limited to this achievement (only the ungenerous will raise a question about the possible *post hoc-propter hoc* fallacy in connection with the use of the word "achievement"). It is a stimulating and even penetrating work in a number of other ways as well.

Its virtue inheres in its frankness. Three points of view were represented in the group: those with a primary faith in constitutional reform, those who urged primary attention to structural and procedural reform under the Constitution, and those whose main hope lay in the slow process of political education; and rarely does one find so honest and sympathetic

an account of the accommodations of persons who seemed to live on different planets and found themselves inhabiting the same world after all. In one sense, the proponents of political education were the victors; for here is, for all the world to see, an example, however limited, of political education at its best.

And in one final respect, this is indeed a notable achievement. Here is a group of men, concerned with organization and control, with amendments and statutes and procedures, nevertheless willing to examine the philosophic bases underlying the democratic purposes whose machinery they seek to improve. They reject the arid absolutes of the "realists" and "idealists" and propose instead an approach that accepts the existence of power, and evil, in the world, but that finds a valid and inalienable place for morality in our own role in the world. They make clear the important distinction between morals and moralizing; and they point out that power is ultimately conditioned by faith, and cannot be counted solely in terms of tons of steel and armored divisions. "Democracies," they say, "must therefore combine morality with power." This is a hard lesson to learn, and harder to apply with wisdom; but unless it is learned and applied, our future will be dark.

Nationalization in Practice

By J. W. Grove, University of Manchester, England

PROBLEMS OF NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY, W. A. Robson editor. Oxford University Press, 1952. Pp. 390. 25s.

EFFICIENCY IN THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES, by Sir Hubert Houldsworth and others. Institute of Public Administration and Allen & Unwin, 1952. Pp. 65. 6s.

NATIONALIZATION IN PRACTICE: THE BRITISH COAL INDUSTRY, by William W. Haynes. Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1953. Pp. 413. \$4.00.

BRITISH COAL NATIONALISED, by Gerhard Ditz. The Edward Hazen Foundation, 1951. Pp. 92. \$1.00.

I

IT is now nearly seven years since the first British industry passed into complete public ownership. On January 1, 1947, during one of the bitterest winters for many years, and at the time of a severe fuel crisis, the coal industry became the property of the nation.

In due course other industries were nationalized—a large part of air and road, and all of rail transport; the partly municipally-owned gas and electricity industries; and some others, ending (in 1949) with iron and steel. Today about one-fifth of British industry is publicly owned.

Certain simple facts stand out clearly from the experience of these seven years. First, na-

tionalization has so far proved to be neither the striking success its advocates hoped nor the dismal failure its opponents feared. Second, the transformation to public ownership has been accomplished with remarkably little disturbance to the life of the nation. There was no counterrevolution by a dispossessed capitalist class. The Labor Government had no need to "suspend the classic formulae of normal opposition," nor to "take vast powers to govern by decree," as Harold Laski had once predicted might be necessary. Even the former shareholders proved not unwilling to receive Treasury-guaranteed stock in exchange for their voting rights. Third, apart from occasional polemical outbursts in Parliament and the press, most of the debate has been about details rather than about the principle of nationalization itself. The only exceptions to this are the road haulage industry (and even here the wisdom of the present Conservative Government's denationalization measure is seriously doubted) and the iron and steel industry, about which the Labor party was probably too hasty. Fourth, among the general public, nationalization has aroused very little interest, and if careful observers of the British political scene are to be believed, the public still obdurately refuses to regard it as an election issue.

Why is it that "nationalization"—the revolution that was to change men overnight, or to reduce old England to irredeemable chaos, according to one's political beliefs—has proved so unrevolutionary and has proceeded so quietly? Why does it continue to evoke so little public enthusiasm or hostility? And why does the Conservative party, once again in power, seem inclined (with the exceptions mentioned) to do so little about it? The answer lies not so much in talk of the "stoicism" or the political apathy of the British people (who are, it is sometimes suggested, unable to recognize the road to serfdom when they see it) or in the difficulties of "unscrambling eggs," as in the history and circumstances of the particular industries that have been nationalized. There was, in fact, by 1945, general if reluctant agreement on all sides that most of them at any rate were "ripe for national ownership." It needed only the advent to power of a Labor Government to

complete a process that had been proceeding for a very long time.

None of this is to say, of course, that determined opposition will not arise if a future Labor Government chooses its victims unwisely—indeed the party has already had to face defection in its own ranks when it proposed to nationalize insurance. But there are still a number of industries ripe for picking: water supply is about the most obvious.

During World War II the miners once again demanded, as they had been doing for nearly forty years, the nationalization of the mines. Mr. Churchill (as he then was) refused, on the ground that this was a matter to be decided at a general election when the war was over, not by a wartime Coalition Government. But the writing was plainly on the wall. The nationalization of coal could not much longer be delayed. A sweeping reorganization of the gas and electricity industries, the desirability of which was widely recognized on all sides, was recommended by the McGowan Committee on the Electricity Industry before the war and the Heyworth Committee on the Gas Industry in 1945, both committees appointed by Conservative or Coalition Governments. In any case about two-thirds of the electricity industry and one-third of the gas industry were already in public ownership, the remainder owned by private utilities being subject to strict regulation by the government. In addition, the creation of the Central Electricity Board in 1926 had been a step toward nationalization.

The development of civil aviation was of immense importance to Britain both for economic reasons and on grounds of national security. But it was equally clear that this development could not be left in unaided private hands. The industry had, indeed, been subsidized for many years, and the Imperial Airways Company was partly controlled by the government. In 1939 it was succeeded by a completely public enterprise, the British Overseas Airways Corporation. The creation of two additional airways corporations by the Labor Government was merely the completion of a process that had been going on for some time. The perennial problem of the British railways, which had steadily grown worse since 1921 when a hundred or so companies were amalga-

mated into four, could only be tackled adequately within the framework of a coordinated national transport policy. This was a powerful incentive toward public ownership, and the nationalization, at the same time, of other forms of land transport. The complete control of the four main-line railway companies, and the substantial control of road haulage transport by the government during World War II, made the transition to nationalization an easy step.

Of the limited progress made under nationalization there is little doubt. All the books under review here testify to this fact, each in its own way. The nationalized industries are confronted by many difficulties at the present time, for which they have often been unjustly blamed, but which are clearly not of their own making. They are inherent in the peculiarly difficult economic situation which faces post-war Britain. For this reason alone—and there are many others—it is impossible to answer the question both the Labor party and the Conservatives, and many of Britain's friends overseas, would dearly like to have definitively answered: "Nationalization—success or failure?" But at the same time, it is undeniable that many of the things that nationalization was supposed to accomplish have not been accomplished; and, more importantly, there is no evidence that they will be accomplished in the foreseeable future.

Sir Hubert Houldsworth (chairman of the National Coal Board), writing in 1952 in *Efficiency in the Nationalised Industries*, says: "I think the progress we have made in five and a half years would have been satisfactory in normal times; today I say it is woefully inadequate for our needs" (p. 9). Mr. Henry Jones (deputy chairman, British Gas Council) says: "It is encouraging, when looking back over a period of a year or so, to be able to see how many different problems have been dealt with. . . . It is not quite so encouraging when one considers the magnitude of the task which still remains" (p. 22). These are hardly comfortable words, but neither are they entirely discouraging. All the nationalized industries share a common record so far—a record of extremely modest achievement, but with an absence of any grave failure.

II

MEANWHILE, large problems exist. Some of these arise from the particular form that nationalization has taken—for instance, the problems of public accountability and consumer control. It is by no means settled that the chosen form of management, the public corporation—that peculiar hybrid fathered by the combined efforts of the Conservative and Labor parties, the Trade Union Congress, and the British civil service—is the best form of management for the nationalized industries. It may be for some but not for others. Professor Robson's excellent symposium, which is certain to remain the standard text on this subject for a long time to come, takes the public corporate form for granted. He includes only a brief discussion of alternative forms of management (four pages), though there are scattered references to "workers' control" throughout the book.

Other problems are inherent in the industry itself; they do not arise from nationalization, or from the particular form that it has taken, but they are problems which nationalization was expected to help solve. Such problems include the crucial one of human relations in the coal industry. Yet others arise more directly from nationalization itself, for instance the problem of overcentralization. This is because nationalization has created large-scale enterprises; the National Coal Board, for example, employs 700,000 workers. Finally, there are "problems" allegedly arising from public ownership in any form—lack of initiative, and so on. In some cases, the assumptions that raise these "problems" are false; e.g. it is by no means certain that publicly-owned undertakings are necessarily less forward-looking and enterprising than those that are privately owned (there is as much "bureaucracy" in the large private British insurance companies as in the British civil service, for instance).

Many of these problems are discussed in the book edited by Professor Robson. He has assembled a team of experts, each of whom deals with a specific topic. These include such matters as ministerial control and parliamentary accountability, labor and staff problems, joint consultation, the consumer interest, public relations, price policy, scientific research, the governing board, efficiency, compensation, and

various problems of organization. There is a long summing-up by Professor Robson himself, occupying more than a quarter of the book, and he also contributes three of the essays. Some of the fourteen essays have appeared in print before, six of them in the *Political Quarterly* April-June, 1950.

Professor Haynes is also concerned with many of these problems as they are found in the nationalized coal industry. His book, which had its origin as a doctoral dissertation, is a good, compact study, and will make a useful textbook. There is perhaps rather too much reliance on secondary sources for a study of this sort, but it is competently done and covers a wide field.

Mr. Ditz, in his short preliminary report on his investigations in the British coal fields, covers some of the ground covered by Professor Haynes, but places a heavy emphasis on the problem of human relations. It is noticeable, too, that although Professor Haynes is principally interested in managerial and organizational questions, at least one-third of his book is devoted to this problem. It is a comparatively minor issue in, for instance, the gas and electricity industries, where industrial relations have traditionally been quite good, but it is also of importance in nationalized transport—particularly rail transport.

Since, in a review of this length, it is impossible to deal with all the issues raised by the authors, efficiency, accountability, and human relations have been selected for special mention.

III

NATIONALIZATION, as Professor Robson points out, "does not by itself resolve the problem of producing and distributing basic goods and services in an efficient and economical manner so as to serve the public interest . . ." (p. 7, my italics). The italicized phrase is of crucial importance here, for it suggests that the normal measures of efficiency used by the accountant may not be adequate for the purpose where public enterprises are concerned. Professor Robson takes this view himself. "We must try," he says, "to evolve statistical yardsticks which will express the performance of an undertaking in terms of the service or commodity which it provides . . ." (pp. 6-7). He

relates his efforts to get a contributor to deal with this subject. The result was discouraging. "The tenour of their replies was . . . that their studies . . . are not sufficiently advanced to enable them to produce an essay on the subject" (p. 7). In other words, we do not yet know how to measure efficiency in this broad sense, including in the measurement (as we should) the social costs incurred and social gains derived from a publicly owned enterprise.

Lord Citrine (chairman, British Electricity Authority), writing in the IPA symposium, says: "Most critics [sic] of nationalisation seem most concerned with the results as disclosed in the annual balance sheets, and while this cannot be regarded as the sole test of efficiency, it is the one which is most generally accepted" (p. 50). Profit as such is, however, no more an indication of "efficiency" in a public monopolistic enterprise than it is in a private monopoly. The nationalized industries can easily make a "profit" or "cover costs" by raising prices against the consumer. Moreover, profit as such is not the concern of a nationalized industry. It has, instead, a broad, threefold obligation: (1) to make its particular goods or services available "in such quantities and at such prices" as are "in the public interest" (an admittedly vague directive); (2) to raise the standards of health, welfare, and safety of its workers (and, by implication, to safeguard their general living standards); and (3) to balance total revenues and expenditures (taking one year with another).

Professors Sargent Florence and Gilbert Walker, in their contribution on "Efficiency" in the Robson symposium, conclude that, just as "the capitalist test of the efficiency of an undertaking is profit," so with a nationalized industry "a surplus or avoidance of loss when subtracting aggregate costs from the aggregate of prices (i.e. 'covering costs' or 'breaking even') [is] . . . the primary test of efficiency" (p. 195). But they have a number of very important reservations. "The money terms, in which the costs are made public, . . . must not neglect social cost" (p. 196, my italics)—but they do not say how this is to be done. There must be no exploitation: the bargaining power of the unions and the public boards must be about equal. Prices must not be raised until the boards have "exhausted every econ-

omy." This is, perhaps, a counsel of perfection.

Efficiency in the Nationalised Industries—the series of papers prepared by four of the chairmen of the boards (with an introduction by Herbert Morrison)—makes it clear that the boards are fully aware of the necessity for achieving "efficiency," but no very clear idea emerges as to what it is, and none of the contributors gives more than a passing mention to its public measurement. They discuss it almost exclusively in terms of the internal operations of their organizations. But the measurement of efficiency in a public monopoly is not merely a question of internal checks—output per manshift, electrical hp. generated per worker, gas generated per pound of coal burned, consumption of diesel oil per bus mile, etc.—there must also exist some external yardstick capable of measuring efficiency in relation to the enterprise as a whole, as it affects the consuming public.

Regard must be paid to the extent to which the enterprise makes provision for future costs (as Mr. Ditz suggests), measured perhaps (if measurement is possible) in terms of rates of technical advance, "rationalization" (e.g. closing of "inefficient" pits, amalgamation of small "unprofitable" gas undertakings etc.), improvement in human relations (as nearly all the writers suggest), and increased productivity.

The problem is important. If such a yardstick could be devised it is possible that much of the petty sniping at the boards would subside—a fact of some significance since, as the chairman of the British Institute of Management (Sir Charles Renold) has suggested, the constant need to answer public criticism is an important contribution to overcentralization of management.

IV

CLOSELY related to the problem of "efficiency" is that of "public accountability." There is a dilemma inherent in the constitutional position of the public corporation which is difficult to resolve. The public corporations were, broadly speaking, to be autonomous so far as day-to-day management was concerned, but on matters of "broad policy" the Minister would exercise a statutory right of control. He would only be responsible to Parliament for those matters for which he was thus statu-

torily responsible. In practice, many anomalies have arisen, as for instance Mr. Ernest Davies testifies in his paper in the Robson book.

The dilemma is simply expressed in a conversation with a Member of Parliament reported by Professor Haynes. In practice, it is impossible to separate day-to-day administration from policy, and furthermore, "it is really day-to-day issues which are meaningful to the public and which together add up to major issues; only through minor grievances are the big policy issues revealed . . ." (p. 258).

This dilemma has not yet been resolved, and it is, perhaps, an additional reason for demanding (if one is possible) an external objective test of "efficiency" that is acceptable to Parliament and the public. The Labor party perhaps believed too readily, when designing its nationalization statutes, that the fact that these industries are specifically charged to "further the public interest" would itself be sufficient to safeguard the consumer. This view, that a public monopoly is somehow immune from the dangers of a private monopoly, is far from generally accepted. Moreover, the Labor party itself obviously had some misgivings since provision was made in nearly all the statutes for some form of "consumer consultative council" to act as a check on the boards. Mr. Frank Milligan considers these in his contribution to the Robson symposium.

The councils, it is fairly generally agreed, are of greatly uneven merit, the worst (in the reviewer's opinion) being the Coal Consumers' Councils (of which there are two) and the Central Transport Consultative Committee. All three have an unmatched record of self-satisfied complacency. They appear to take the somewhat aggrieved view that the consumer has really no right to complain. It is little wonder that they have so soon acquired the reputation of "stooges for the Boards." In only one case at the time he was writing, reports Mr. Milligan, had a consumer council refused to agree to price increases and exercised its statutory right to appeal to higher authority—in this case, the British Electricity Authority. Mr. Milligan adds the rather curious remark: "This is the only instance so far disclosed where the consultative relationship between board and council *has broken down*" (p. 165, *my italics*). One would have thought this an

occasion for applause rather than lament—that here was a council with the courage to do its job, even though it may actually have been misguided in opposing the increase.

Professor Arthur Lewis is not convinced that the consumer is adequately protected. He argues that the long history of public utility control in all democratic countries has established three principles:

1. The right of the individual to get the service he requires so long as he is prepared to pay the cost, and to appeal to an independent tribunal to enforce this right.
2. The right of an individual to be protected against undue preference, and to appeal to an independent authority against it.
3. The right of the consumers as a whole to be charged not more than cost . . . and to have the general level of charges independently established. (p. 193)

He finds it "absolutely astonishing" that, except for nationalized transport, "the Labour Government has not only failed to safeguard these rights, but has actually fiercely resisted suggestions that they should be written into the Acts. . . ."

It is clear that the consumer is insufficiently protected as things stand at present. The problem of what to do about it without interfering unduly with the autonomy of the boards is another matter. There is much to be said in theory for some kind of independent tribunal for the fixing of prices and for safeguarding the individual consumer's interest, but from the record of the present Transport Tribunal, and its predecessor, the Railway Rates Tribunal, it is far from clear that this is really the right way to go about it.

V

THE problem of human relations in the British coal industry is one of the most fascinating yet certainly one of the most intractable of all the problems facing the boards. As Mr. Ditz reminds us, it was coal that made Britain, in the nineteenth century, the leading capitalist economy in the world. Coal was not only the basis of her domestic industry, it shaped the present face of Britain, for industry grew up—and has largely remained—on and around the coal fields. It was coal that contributed in

part to Britain's position as a world power, as the late Ernest Bevin not so long ago eloquently testified. "If only I had some coal to export," he lamented, "I should be able to talk to these countries on more equal terms."

Yet by the beginning of the present century the British coal industry was already very sick. Britons, says Mr. Ditz, had apparently forgotten the importance of coal, and, perhaps more importantly, they had forgotten the man who got it. He prefaces his essay with the inscription on the Miner's Memorial in Durham Cathedral: "He breaketh open a shaft away from where men sojourn; They are forgotten of the foot that passeth by" (Job 28.4). This inscription is a moving testimony to the tragic isolation of the British miner.

With the development of a powerful union in the early part of this century, the miners began to demand insistently that the mines should be publicly owned. The failure of the General Strike of 1926, followed by the punitive Trades Disputes Act of 1927, was the last victory for the colliery owners, but with it went, as Mr. Ditz points out, "their last chance to reach a permanent peace with the miners." The events of 1926 and 1927 made the nationalization of coal ultimately inevitable. There was no doubt, when the Labor party was returned to power in 1945, that among its first acts would be the repeal of the Trades Disputes Act (an event which was celebrated in the House of Commons by the singing, for the first—and probably the last—time of the "Red Flag") and the nationalization of the mines.

The miners had long looked to "nationalization" as the cure for the troubles that afflicted them. The belief in nationalization, says Mr. Ditz, "was not merely an expedient concocted by the miners to satisfy their economic demands or the power aspirations of their leaders," it was a Utopia, a faith to live by. "The trumpet shall sound, and we shall be changed." They came to believe that the impossible could be accomplished—the transformation of "their" industry and their lives overnight.

None of this has, of course, come about. There has been but slight improvement in industrial relations in the industry. The National Coal Board has made sincere efforts in this direction, and has shown a great eagerness to follow a policy more enlightened

than that of the past. But the traditional attitudes of both the colliery managers and the miners still linger on. In spite of their apparent radicalism, the miners are strongly conservative and bound by habit. They distrust new methods and new ideas, are highly individualistic, and find it difficult to forget the past. The mine managers, also, are usually suspicious of change, and many of them resent the new regime which, they claim, has restricted the freedom they possessed when they worked for the colliery companies.

The miner is disappointed with the results of nationalization. To him, as Professor Haynes observes, the Promised Land looks extraordinarily like the wilderness which he has just left. The extent to which his disillusionment is reflected in his present behavior is, however, far from clear. The two major problems facing the National Coal Board are the very high rates of absenteeism—11.96 per cent in 1950, in spite of the introduction of the five-day week—and the phenomenon of the “unofficial strike.” Neither of these is directly attributable to nationalization. Absenteeism was 16.31 per cent in 1945, just prior to nationalization, but, allowing for the effect of the five-day week, nationalization has brought little or no improvement. Though “the general tendency to strike is not primarily related to the form of ownership,” Professor Haynes observes that the modern trend toward *national* agreements on wages and conditions (which nationalization has accelerated) in what is, in these matters, a

highly diversified industry, may underlie a good deal of the dissatisfaction which precipitates the strikes. Decisions are made too far from the colliery itself.

Professor Haynes concludes that improvement in human relations in the coal industry since nationalization is “not easily discernible.” Nationalization has not come up to the miners’ expectations, and “in most respects industrial relations . . . are very much as they were under private ownership just before [Vesting Day]” (p. 184).

This is a depressing conclusion, since increased mechanization and improved human relations must go together if productivity is to be increased—the Coal Board’s primary task. Increased mechanization is not a mere substitute for better human relations. Manifestly productivity will never be increased by exhorting the miners to dig more coal. Professor Haynes and Mr. Ditz put forward some interesting hypotheses concerning the present state of human relations in the industry (for example, about the effects of the introduction of Longwall Mining on the working group). Here is a fertile field for important sociological research which would pay rich dividends. There is some doubt that the National Coal Board is doing enough in this respect to uncover the real causes of dissatisfaction and discontent in the coal fields. The opportunity was never seized while the mines were privately owned. One would expect a public enterprise to make it its first concern.

Contemporary Topics

Compiled by Public Administration Clearing House

New Reorganization Developments

The second bill to become law over President Eisenhower's signature amended the Reorganization Act of 1949 to extend the application of its provisions, expiring April 1, 1953, to reorganization plans transmitted to the Congress any time before April 1, 1955. Under this act the President is authorized to submit reorganization plans which, unless disapproved by an "absolute" majority of the total membership of either house, become effective at the end of sixty days. An attempt was made in the House of Representatives to change the provisions of the act to require only a "simple" majority of those present and voting in either house for rejection of a plan but this amendment failed of adoption.

President Eisenhower's first reorganization proposal, establishing the new Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, was sent to Congress on March 12. Between that date and June 1 he presented nine additional proposals affecting, among others, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Council of Economic Advisers, the foreign aid and the overseas information programs, and the Departments of Agriculture and Defense.

In the preparation of his reorganization proposals, the President was assisted by his Advisory Committee on Government Organization, which he appointed shortly after his election and to which he gave official status after his inauguration by an Executive order issued January 24. Chairman of this committee was Nelson A. Rockefeller, more recently appointed Under Secretary in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; the other members were Arthur Flemming, now director of the new permanent Office of Defense Mobilization, and Milton Eisenhower. The members of this committee worked with designated officials of the various departments and agencies where reorganization measures were

under consideration. In the Defense Department, however, the President's Committee did not operate as such. Instead the Secretary of Defense set up a Committee on Department of Defense Organization which included, in addition to the three members of the President's Committee, General Omar N. Bradley, former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, David Sarnoff, and Dr. Vannevar Bush.

Reorganization Plan No. 1, establishing the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, became effective on April 11 instead of after the usual sixty days, as the result of the passage of a joint resolution providing that the plan should take effect "ten days after the date of the enactment of this joint resolution, and its approval by the President" which was introduced by Congressman Clare Hoffman of Michigan. A similar resolution was introduced by Congressman Hoffman with reference to Plan No. 6, reorganizing the Department of Defense, but with an additional proviso that two subsections of the plan relating to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not take effect. This resolution was of particular significance since it proposed to open the way for amendments to reorganization plans by vote of a simple majority, which would, in effect, nullify the provision of the law requiring the vote of an absolute majority to disapprove a plan. Hearings were held on this resolution by the Committee on Government Operations of the House but the suggested changes were not approved.

Presidential Personnel Adviser

The chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission has been given additional responsibilities by an Executive order issued by President Eisenhower which designates him as the adviser and assistant for all personnel management actions taken by or under the direction of the President except actions concerning

presidential appointments. The same order abolishes the Liaison Office for Personnel Management which was established in the White House Office in 1939. The order also specifies that the chairman of the commission shall "undertake on behalf of the President, and in collaboration with the Bureau of the Budget, a program designed to raise the level of effectiveness of personnel management in the executive departments and agencies, to improve steadily all civilian personnel management systems, and to bring about the proper coordination in personnel management among the executive departments and agencies." Prior to the issuance of this order the President announced, in connection with the appointment of Philip Young as chairman of the commission, that he would be invited to meetings of the Cabinet.

Schedule C

A new category of positions in the federal government to be excepted from the competitive civil service has been established by Executive Order 10440, amending Civil Service Rule VI. Under this rule the commission is authorized to except from the competitive service positions to which appointments through competitive examination are not practicable. Positions excepted under this rule were formerly designated as follows:

Schedule A. Positions other than those of a confidential or policy-determining character for which it is not practicable to examine shall be placed in Schedule A.

Schedule B. Positions other than those of a confidential or policy-determining character for which it is not practicable to hold a competitive examination shall be placed in Schedule B. Appointments to these positions shall be subject to such noncompetitive examination as may be prescribed by the Commission.

Under the amended rule a new Schedule C is added for "positions of a confidential or policy-determining character." Persons appointed to these positions may be removed without regard to civil service rules and regulations except as required by the Veterans' Preference Act.

Following issuance of this order, the heads of all departments and agencies were directed to identify positions which should be placed

in the new schedule and submit their recommendations to the Civil Service Commission for review. In order to take care of this additional work load the commission has brought in several of its regional directors who have worked with small task force groups drawn from the personnel of the commission.

Commenting on the creation of the new Schedule C, Civil Service Chairman Philip Young, in an interview with the editors in the March-April, 1953, issue of *Good Government* published by the National Civil Service League, said:

... There has never been a sufficiently clear dividing line between government service as a career and appointive jobs under the administration in power. Ideally, there should be well-defined career lines to follow from the time a man starts in government until he reaches the top. That way, when he takes a policy-making job, he knows what he's getting into.

Congressional Studies of Personnel

The House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service has set up two subcommittees to make detailed studies of the personnel management programs of the federal government. Congressman R. J. Corbett of Pennsylvania is chairman of the Subcommittee on Manpower Utilization. This committee has sent to all major departments and agencies a detailed five-part questionnaire designed to secure information about their activities in the areas of organization, program planning, personnel management, fiscal management, and general services. The questionnaire stresses the recommendations of the Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch and asks for specific information on what recommendations have been put into effect and what consideration is being given to remaining recommendations.

This same subcommittee has addressed letters to the heads of the Departments of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force; Mutual Security Agency (now Foreign Operations Administration); State Department; Civil Service Commission; Bureau of the Budget; and General Accounting Office, asking for their views and recommendations on overseas personnel management. The letter contains a reference to the Report on Overseas Pay and Personnel

Practices submitted last January by Senator Olin D. Johnston, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, which was based to a considerable degree on information collected and compiled by the Civil Service Commission and the Bureau of the Budget. With the approval of Chairman Corbett, an interagency committee of representatives of the departments and agencies addressed (except GAO which asked to be excused because it did not think it suitable for it as a postauditing agent to participate) is holding a series of discussions for the purpose of arriving at areas of agreement which can be used as a basis for legislative proposals to be submitted to the Congress this fall.

Congressman Harold C. Hagen of Minnesota is chairman of a Subcommittee on Federal Civil Service. This committee has sent to all major departments and a number of selected independent agencies an outline of major civil service activities with a request for comments on the success of these activities and recommendations for improvement. A press release issued by the subcommittee indicates that inquiries will also be addressed to "several outstanding state governments, the principal employee organizations, associations whose purpose is to improve civil service, representatives of private business, and leaders in the field of education."

Members of the subcommittee or of the committee staff expect to visit selected regional offices of the Civil Service Commission.

The Senate Subcommittee on Federal Manpower Policies (see Summer, 1952, *Review*, p. 214) has issued a series of reports on the following subjects:

- Supervisory Selection in the Federal Government
- Incentive Awards Program in the Federal Government
- Reduction in Force System in the Federal Government
- Effect of Personnel Office Staffing Ratios on Manpower Utilization
- Personnel Investigations of Employees and Applicants for Employment in the Executive Branch of the Government for Loyalty, Suitability, and Security
- Military Personnel in Civilian Occupations
- Training and Education in the Federal Government

- Manpower Utilization by the Federal Government through the Use of Private Contract Labor
- Appeals and Grievance Procedures in the Federal Government
- Administration of the Classification Act of 1949 and the Compensation Process Established by the Act
- Analysis of the Whitten Amendment
- Improving the Federal Administrative Management Program
- Personnel Recruitment and Employment Practices in the Federal Government

This subcommittee, which was headed by the Democratic chairman of the Senate committee, has been discontinued with the change in administration and it is not likely that draft bills contained in some of the reports, and other specific recommendations, will be acted upon directly by the new administration. However, the material contained in this series of reports will undoubtedly serve as useful reference material for the new committees undertaking studies in this field.

Advisory Groups

One of the distinctive features of the new look in Washington is extensive use of special committees, commissions, and other advisory groups in the development of the new administration's policies. President Eisenhower's intention, frequently expressed during the campaign, to call upon the nation's best brains has thus far resulted in establishment of over a dozen special groups which differ widely in type of membership, permanence, legal status, and point of attachment to the governmental structure.

Even before inauguration, the President-elect had appointed, on an interim basis, the Myers committee on agriculture (see Winter, 1953, *Review*, p. 65) and the Rockefeller committee on government organization (see "New Reorganization Developments," above). Both of these groups have now been formally established. Shortly after inauguration, a Committee on International Information Activities, headed by William H. Jackson, was appointed to examine policies and organization in the general area of information, propaganda, and psychological strategy. In March, President Eisenhower appointed seven highly placed persons from business, education, labor, and

journalism to assist the National Security Council, but it was announced that these men would function primarily as individual consultants rather than as a committee.

The Defense, Commerce, and Labor Departments and Foreign Operations Administration have also appointed advisory groups for various purposes, and a conference of judges, lawyers, and trial examiners has been called to discuss means of reducing delays, expense, and volume of records in quasi-judicial and rule-making agencies.

Among the important of the new advisory bodies are three commissions created by congressional action. One of these—the new Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch which is to be headed by former President Hoover—is similar to the earlier Hoover Commission in size and method of appointment (four members appointed by the President and four each by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House). The assignment of the new commission, however, has been broadened to authorize it to make recommendations concerning the reassignment or discontinuance of federal functional programs as well as organizational matters. A Commission on Intergovernmental Relations is authorized to examine the present division of responsibilities, functions, and fiscal resources among the federal government, states, and localities with a view to decentralizing responsibilities and minimizing duplication of effort. A third commission approved during the final session of Congress is to undertake a broad review of the country's foreign economic policy and report to the President and Congress next March. Establishment of this commission was urged by the administration in connection with its request for a one-year expansion of the reciprocal trade program.

Governmental Units in the United States

Governmental units in the United States were reduced in number by about 25 per cent in the ten years following the enumeration of governmental units for the 1942 *Census of Governments*. A drop of 38 per cent in the number of school districts accounts for a large part of this decrease but school districts still

make up three-fifths of the 1952 total of 116,743. These figures are contained in the Bureau of the Census report, *Governments in the United States in 1952*, which is part of the Bureau's series of special studies on state and local government. The survey also includes statistical and comparative data on counties, municipalities, townships, and special districts. This special districts category, which includes fire districts, drainage districts, soil conservation districts, and a variety of special authorities, is the only one which showed an important increase—from 8,299 in 1942 to 12,319 in 1952.

Civil Service in States and Cities

Enactment of a civil service law in Montana covering most of the 4,000 state employees brings the number of merit system states to 23, according to a recent report by the National Civil Service League. Objective of the new law, which resulted from investigations by the state's "Little Hoover Commission," is to reduce turnover, which has sometimes been as high as 100 per cent a year in the clerical staff, and to establish a job classification system and a sound salary and career plan.

In addition to laws covering their own employees, several states have statutes which require the application of civil service rules to municipal employees within the state. Iowa and Ohio, for example, require cities to have a three-member civil service board appointed by the mayor to serve the city employees. New York requires each city in the state to provide a three-member civil service commission appointed by the mayor to make use of the county civil service commission. New Jersey cities operate under the state Civil Service Commission, which provides statewide recruitment, examination, certification, and classification and specific rules regarding veterans' preference, promotion, pay, and political activity.

In Massachusetts, state law requires that all cities over 100,000 population operate under the state Civil Service Commission. Cities under 100,000 may elect to use the state system. All Wisconsin cities over 4,000 population must provide a five-member commission appointed by the mayor to administer the personnel func-

tions for policemen and firemen. In Alabama, a personnel board appointed by the officials of the county and its largest city handle personnel functions for all cities over 5,000 in the larger counties of the state. Other states, for example Minnesota and New York, provide services to cities on a contractual basis.

Statistics contained in the 1953 *Municipal Year Book* indicate that two-thirds of the cities in the United States with a population over 10,000 have formal civil service systems. However, only about one-third of the civil service systems cover all city employees.

A total of 691 cities over 10,000 population operate under local civil service boards or commissions. Of these 691 cities, 545 have three-member civil service boards; 123 have five-member boards; and 23 have boards of other sizes ranging from two to nine members.

An additional 123 cities operate under state or county systems.

Council-Manager Trends

This year's annual review of the council-manager form of government as reported in the 1953 *Municipal Year Book*, published by the International City Managers' Association, indicates a continuing increase in the number of cities adopting the plan. The trend toward the professionalization of the career of city manager also continued in 1952.

The number of local governments operating under the council-manager plan increased by 69 in 1952, and 7 cities adopted the plan early in 1953, bringing to 1,146 the number of cities and counties in the United States and Canada using the council-manager form of government as of March 1, 1953. This is more than double the number using the plan at the end of 1940.

The population of all places operating under the council-manager plan now totals more than 23 million, according to the 1950 census. Nearly 39 per cent of all cities in the United States over 25,000 have council-manager government, as do 34 per cent of the cities between 10,000 and 25,000 population. In cities between 50,000 and 100,000 and in those between 250,000 and 500,000, the number having the council-manager form of government exceeds the number using the mayor-council or commission plan.

Maine, with 117 places under the council-

manager plan, leads all other states, followed by California with 106 council-manager cities and counties, Texas with 94, Michigan with 85, and Virginia with 63.

Eleven cities held referendums during 1952 on the continuation of the council-manager plan. Voters in all of them decided to keep the plan. However, in 35 other cities the voters last year rejected proposals to adopt the council-manager form of government.

According to the *Year Book* several cities in 1952 provided for the appointment of administrators with powers and duties too circumscribed to qualify them as council-manager cities. New Orleans, for example, adopted a charter providing for the strong mayor plan with a chief administrator appointed by the mayor who in turn appoints many of the department heads. This plan is similar to the plan provided in the Philadelphia charter adopted in 1951. A number of smaller cities in other states adopted ordinances creating the position of administrative officer, but cities and towns that have adopted such modified manager plans are not included in the count of council-manager places.

Forty-nine per cent of all city managers appointed during 1952 had previously been managers in other cities, administrative assistants to managers, or interns in council-manager cities. Nearly 86 per cent of the managers appointed during 1952 were men with training and experience in public administration.

The rate of turnover of managers was the lowest in history (11 per cent), and the average tenure (excluding those with less than two years of service) was 8.4 years in a single city compared with 8.9 in 1950 and 9.7 in 1951.

New York City Manager Plan

Governor Dewey has appointed a nine-member Temporary State Commission to study the feasibility of adapting the city manager form of government to New York City's needs. Chairman of the commission is Devereaux C. Josephs, president of the New York Life Insurance Company. Research director is Wallace S. Sayre, chairman of the Department of Government at the College of the City of New York.

The Commission has been holding numerous meetings and hearings during the summer

and expects to have its report ready in September. Any change in the city charter involving the transfer of duties and functions now vested in an elected official would require approval at a referendum before it would become effective.

The chairman of the Commission, in a statement issued in connection with Mr. Sayre's appointment, emphasized the fact that this Commission is not an investigatory body and noted that "a number of other significant studies have been made . . . including the report of the Mayor's Committee on Management Survey completed last March."

This massive survey, for which Luther Gulick served as executive director, did not specifically recommend adoption of the city manager plan. However, Volume I of the final report points out that organizational structure and management practices in New York City have not given sufficient recognition to the differences between top policy and general management and that "the top management job has never been clearly visualized and separated out for specialized handling." The Mayor's Committee advances the idea that the mayor and his top aides, together with the comptroller and the Board of Estimate, should constitute a central directorate. Under this plan, the mayor would be responsible for coordination of all of the activities of the city, assisted by a staff which would include a deputy with the title "director of administration." The deputy would maintain a central reporting system which would gather current progress reports from all agencies and would transmit to all agencies information or instructions which the mayor wishes them to have in the interest of coordination. The director of administration would take over the functions of the present coordinator of construction with extensive added powers. The mayor's annual management reports would be prepared by this deputy. He would thus be the two-way channel, facilitating the flow of information, problems, and decisions between the departments and the mayor; he would also be responsible for seeing that any matter presented to the mayor for action in the management field was properly prepared for consideration. Definitions of departmental and divisional missions would be worked out by the director of administra-

tion in cooperation with the director of the budget.

Civil Defense in Cities

Civil defense programs in America's major cities are currently emphasizing the establishment of a framework of organization and the recruitment and training of a core of volunteers in essential services, capable of rapid expansion in case of necessity. Certain physical preparations for emergencies are being carried out, including surveying and marking shelters, zoning civil defense sectors and evacuation routes, and putting into operation control centers and attack warning systems. A number of cities are stockpiling medical and rescue supplies and most of them are doing varying amounts of educational work and volunteer personnel training.

A recent survey of municipal civil defense activities by the American Municipal Association shows that 15 of the 30 cities replying to the AMA queries have increased their 1953 budgets for civil defense as compared with 1952, whereas 13 have reduced their budgets for this item. Highest 1953 budgets reported are for Portland, Oregon, which increased from \$40,000 to \$640,000, and San Diego, California, which increased from \$43,000 to \$257,000. Kansas City, Missouri, and Akron, Ohio, have more than tripled their appropriations for 1953 as compared with 1952, and Minneapolis, Minnesota; Birmingham, Alabama; and Dayton, Ohio, have doubled theirs.

On the other hand, reductions were made in Columbus, Ohio, of nearly one-half and in Indianapolis, Indiana, of one-third. Other cities which cut their civil defense budgets this year include Memphis, Tennessee; Oakland, California; Jersey City, New Jersey; Fort Worth, Texas; Long Beach, California; Providence, Rhode Island; and Jacksonville, Florida. However, some of these reductions reflect the completion of major expenditures for civil defense installations and equipment.

The number of paid staff workers for civil defense is generally very limited. Portland, Oregon, and San Diego, California, have 10 each and only four cities have a larger staff—Newark, New Jersey, and Oakland, California, with 18 each; Syracuse, New York, with 12;

and Denver, Colorado with 11. Several cities have no formally designated paid staff for civil defense.

To implement their small permanent staffs and to carry on a large percentage of the program for which there is no paid staff, cities have organized civil defense volunteers. Such volunteer organizations range from several hundred in Cincinnati, Ohio; San Antonio, Texas; Louisville, Kentucky; and Providence, Rhode Island, to over 15,000 in Miami, Florida; Kansas City, Missouri; Syracuse, New York; and Denver, Colorado.

Department of Administration in Kansas

A Department of Administration was established in Kansas on July 1 as a result of legislation enacted by the 1953 State Legislature. The department will be headed by an executive director to serve at the pleasure of the Governor and will include divisions of personnel, purchasing, budget, accounts, and reports. The division heads will be in the classified civil service, appointed after competitive examination.

The Legislature in 1951 created in the office of the Governor, for a two-year period, a Division of Administration with the duty, among others, of cooperating with the Legislative Council in drafting a bill to reorganize and modernize the fiscal, accounting, purchasing, and budget affairs of the state in a single administrative department. The new law is a result of this effort.

The principal duties of the new department are stated to be: to develop financial policies and plans for consideration of the Governor and the incoming Governor, as the basis for the executive budget; to prepare the detailed documents to carry out the financial plan; to coordinate and supervise all fiscal affairs and procedures and execute policies and plans approved by the Legislature; to approve audit claims, make special investigations upon request, purchase and store supplies, install and maintain records, issue warrants, provide central and consolidated services, and develop plans for improvements and economies in the organization and operation of the various state administrative agencies.

Legislative review and control will be provided by an independent postaudit and by a

State Finance Council, consisting of three legislators, the Governor, and the Lieutenant Governor, as an advisory and review board.

Most of the powers of the present Civil Service Board are transferred to the executive director and the State Finance Council. The board will continue to hear appeals of employees and will consult with the executive director on rules recommended by the personnel director.

Local Governments Merger

Twelve surrounding suburban communities merged with Toronto, Ontario, on April 15 to become the Municipality of Greater Toronto with a population of about 1,200,000 in an area of over 240 square miles. The population of Toronto proper is 678,000.

The American Society of Planning Officials reports that the legislation setting up the federation of local governments concentrates on reforms in metropolitan planning. The merger comes about at the direction of the Ontario Provincial Government.

A council of 24 members, with a chairman to be named at first by the provincial government, will govern the new Greater Toronto. Starting in 1955 the chairman will be elected by the council.

Each of the 12 suburban mayors will have one vote and Toronto proper will have 12 votes. The Toronto members of the council will be the mayor, 2 controllers, and 9 aldermen.

The new council will have control over planning and zoning, housing, parks and recreation, major arterial routes, water supply and sewerage, and all statutory county functions including jails, homes for the aged, and public hospitals. In addition, the council will be able to impose area-wide assessments.

Public transportation will be coordinated in an independent authority to be called the Toronto Transit Commission. Also separate from the council will be a Metropolitan Board of Education.

Powers not delegated specifically to the federated council will remain with the local councils, including police and fire protection. The suburbs also will keep full taxing powers.

One result expected of the merger is the use of lower-cost vacant suburban land rather than

higher-valued tracts of Toronto proper for construction of low-cost housing. The Greater Toronto council also will have access to province-federal aid grants previously limited to Toronto.

New Technical Assistance Bulletins

A regular bulletin of information on technical assistance in the field of public administration will begin publication, probably early this fall, as the result of an agreement completed in the spring between the U.S. Mutual Security Agency and the TCA-Institute of Inter-American Affairs in the State Department (now consolidated within the new Foreign Operations Administration) and the UN Technical Assistance Administration. The agreement authorizes a contract with the International Institute of Administrative Sciences in Brussels to publish the new periodical bulletin, *Progress in Public Administration*, which will contain reports on progress in public administration programs overseas, particularly in countries receiving aid from the sponsoring agencies. It is also planned to include articles analyzing self-initiated administrative projects in countries not receiving technical assistance. The bulletin will include personnel notes, excerpts from selected reports and letters, and bibliographical items.

Initially, the bulletin will be a bimonthly of about 16 pages. English, French, and Spanish language editions will be issued. Distribution will be provided by the contributing agencies which will obtain bulk shipments of the bulletin and distribute copies to their offices and staffs overseas. It is hoped that eventually arrangements will be made for individual subscriptions.

A privately sponsored news sheet on programs of economic and social progress in the world's less developed areas was initiated this spring. *Doorway to the 20th Century* is a four-page bulletin, published twice a month under the editorship of Andrew E. Rice, 3600 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 7, D. C., at an annual subscription rate of \$5.00. It contains notes on official technical assistance programs, activities of business and investment groups, philanthropic organizations and foundations, research programs, conferences, and

seminars, and a bibliography of publications and films.

International Census Developments

A program of scientific research on trends of population in various parts of the world and on the interrelationship between them and social and economic problems is being undertaken by members of the United Nations Secretariat at the request of the Population Commission of the Economic and Social Council.

While only rough estimates of population are available for areas inhabited by at least one-third of the world's people and statistics for another third are inadequate, the pattern of census taken in the last decade offers the basis for a "calculated" guess to serve as a guide to the probable resources and production needs of the world during the next fifty to seventy years.

Compilation of census statistics on any reliable scale began in the eighteenth century, but as late as 1850, according to one of the reports prepared for the commission, only 200 million people were enumerated. The number has increased regularly almost every decade since, and around 1950 more than 1,400 million persons were enumerated in 156 geographical areas comprising an estimated 59 per cent of the world. Great progress has been made in the Western Hemisphere (only Peru and Uruguay have not taken a census in the decade ending 1952), but few censuses have been taken on the African continent. However, the number of inhabitants of Africa for whom no recent data are available is relatively minor in relation to the world population.

The censuses around 1950 are of special interest because they were carried out in accordance with several specific international recommendations. Considerable international assistance was given to help countries get maximum value from their censuses and to make the figures more comparable. Sex, age, marital status, and some measure of economic activity have been included in the majority of the censuses and, in many others, place of birth and citizenship are included. Many of the countries included questions on education; most of the others asked about ability to read and write.

International Municipal Cooperation

The annual meeting of the American Committee for International Municipal Cooperation was held on May 6 at "1313" headquarters in Chicago. Officers of the committee were re-elected to the following offices: chairman—Herbert Emmerich, director, Public Administration Clearing House; vice chairmen—Paul Betters, executive director, U.S. Conference of Mayors and Clarence E. Ridley, executive director, International City Managers' Association; secretary—Edwin T. Haeefe, Public Administration Clearing House. Donald F. Herrick, executive director, American Public Works Association, was elected to the Executive Committee, which now consists of Mr. Herrick; Mr. Walter H. Blucher, executive director, American Society of Planning Officials; the chairman and the two vice chairmen.

The American Committee serves both the International Union of Local Authorities in The Hague and the Inter-American Municipal Organization, with headquarters in Havana. During the meeting, the past and future activities of the IULA and the IMO were described and 1953 contributions to the IMO and IULA were approved. The chairman of the committee was authorized to invite other organizations to affiliate with the American Committee.

Japanese Form Public Service Training Council

A program for the improvement of public service training in Japan has been inaugurated with the formal establishment last year of a Public Service Training Council replacing and considerably expanding the scope of the Council of Public Service Training Institutions which had been formed in June, 1948. The council is a professional association of persons interested in training in the public service, providing for institutional membership by national and local government agencies, public service corporations, and associated training centers, as well as for individual memberships.

Among the activities of the council are the publication of a monthly newsletter, already commenced, and of a quarterly journal, still in the planning stage. The council has also established a central office and reference library, and has signaled its interest in ex-

changing information with institutions in other countries concerned with the training of public servants by the publication of an English-language report on its activities. It also expresses its interest in helping to arrange for the exchange of professors and instructors between Japanese and foreign training institutions.

The Training Council may be addressed: c/o Personnel Training Section, Japan Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, 2, Aoi-cho, Akasaka, Minotoku, Tokyo, Japan.

Dutch Constitutional Change

The Dutch Parliament completed ratification on May 20, 1953, of a number of constitutional amendments making the Netherlands the first of the Western European nations involved to change its basic law to permit the transfer of national sovereignty to supranational organizations. The provision permitting the delegation to supranational authorities of legislative, administrative, and judicial powers was drafted to remove any doubt concerning the constitutionality of the treaties establishing organizations such as the Coal and Steel Community, the European Defense Community, and a European political community.

Other changes enacted by the amendments, the first since 1948, include the following:

- (1) International agreements at variance with the Constitution may be ratified by a two-thirds vote of Parliament. Heretofore a constitutional amendment—involving a long process, including the election of a new Parliament—was required in each case.
- (2) Dutch law is subordinated to international agreements. Dutch courts must refuse to apply Dutch laws in conflict with these agreements.
- (3) Parliament may give its "tacit approval" to international agreements by not asking that such agreements be submitted to it for a formal decision.

Civil-Military Relations Studies

A three-year study of the effect of military considerations on national policies of the United States will be initiated this fall,

financed by a grant from the Twentieth Century Fund. Director of the study will be Harold Stein, until recently the staff director of the Inter-University Case Program and a consultant to the Public Administration Clearing House. Headquarters will be at Princeton, New Jersey, where Mr. Stein has also been appointed visiting lecturer at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs of Princeton University for the coming academic year.

This project marks the entry of the Fund into a new field. For the past fifteen years or more the Twentieth Century Fund has operated exclusively as an agency for research and public education on current economic questions. However, the trustees recently decided to expand the Fund's field of activities to include the study of social and political forces that affect our national life.

Choice of the subject for this first project in the expanded program was based on a recognition of the greatly increased significance of military factors in the development of national policy. The study will examine the way in which military considerations were given weight in a series of specific cases, and will give particular attention to the interrelationships of civilian and military officers of the government in the formulation of policy. Plans call for embodying both case studies and generalized findings in a report for the general public.

During the past year, Mr. Stein has been serving as a member of the Civil-Military Relations Research Committee of the Social Science Research Council. Chairman of this Committee is William T. R. Fox of Columbia University. Other members are McGeorge Bundy of Harvard University, Gordon A. Craig of Princeton University, and John P. Miller of Yale University. This committee is interested in stimulating research in the field of civil-military relations, especially in areas of the subject which have heretofore received little attention. Members of the group have been reviewing materials published since 1940 relating to civil-military relations and are publishing a bibliography covering the most important items in the field. They have also completed an informal survey of current research in the field which is to be published shortly as

a journal article; it will include a listing of university courses as well as research projects.

New Case Program Director

Paul Ylvisaker of the Department of Political Science, Swarthmore College, has been appointed staff director of the Inter-University Case Program, to succeed Harold Stein. Headquarters of the program, a project to further the writing and teaching of case studies in public administration, have been moved from Washington to Swarthmore College where Mr. Ylvisaker will divide his time between teaching and directing the program.

The ICP—with which about forty-five universities and other institutions are affiliated—encourages case writing and teaching by publishing case studies written by students, faculty members, and others, and by acting as a clearinghouse of information on case development and use.

U.K. Study of Executive Structure

The Institute of Public Administration of London, England, has received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation for a group research project to be undertaken by the Institute of developments in the structure of executive government, both central and regional, in the United Kingdom since the publication in 1918 of the Haldane Report on the machinery of government.

Name Change for Management Council

The National Management Council, organized in 1933 to promote the dissemination of the techniques of management, voted at its annual meeting to change its name to the Council for International Progress in Management. The change reflects the great interest of the Council in the exchange of management ideas at the international level as a means of strengthening the free enterprise system in the world. The U.S. Council and similar councils in nineteen other nations make up the International Committee for Scientific Management. The American Society for Public Administration is a member of the U.S. Council.



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
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